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BLOWING OUT ALL THE CANDLES: A FEW
THOUGHTS ON THE TWENTY-FIFTH BIRTHDAY OF
THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT OF 1984
J.C. Oleson *
I. INTRODUCTION
Happy Birthday, Sara!
Yes, I know that your full name is the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987, codified at 18 U.S.C. §
3551 et seq. and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991 to 998, but that's an awful
mouthful. And really, you'll always be just "SRA"-Sara-to me.
Sara, 2009 was your twenty-fifth birthday and in your honor,
throughout 2009 and early 2010, the United States Sentencing
Commission ("Commission") held parties across the country.' Yes,
I know, officially they called them regional hearings, convened
* Senior Lecturer, Department of Sociology, University of Auckland. J.D., 2001,
School of Law, University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall); Ph.D., 1998, University of
Cambridge; M. Phil., 1995, University of Cambridge; B.A., 1994, Saint Mary's College of
California.
I owe thanks to many colleagues who kindly provided comments about the draft ma-
nuscript, including David Ball, Amy Baron-Evans, Paul Cassell, Joshua Dressler, Jim
Felman, Emery Lee, Erik Luna, Ted McKee, Peter Owen, Scott Sundby, Stephen Vance,
and Kathleen Williams. I would also like to thank Michael Matheson, David Tabakin, and
the staff of the University of Richmond Law Review for their work on the article.
1. See Press Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Sentencing Comm'n to Conduct Re-
gional Public Hearings on Federal Sentencing Policy (Jan. 13, 2009), http://www.ussc.gov/
Legislative andPublicAffairs/Newsroom/PressReleases/20090113_01_PressRelease.
htm [hereinafter Commission Press Release].
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pursuant to the Commission's authority under 28 U.S.C. § 994(o),
but we know that they were really birthday parties for you.
And you deserve birthday parties. Life has not been easy for
you. You endured a nearly decade-long gestation2 and a traumatic
birth.' Soon after you were born, hundreds of federal judges con-
demned you as unconstitutional,4 and that controversy went all
the way to the Supreme Court.5 Then, like so many others coming
of age, you endured growing pains and the sturm und drang of
adolescence. As a preteen, your confidence was shaken by the af-
termath of the Rodney King incident,6 but in your teenage years,
you grew big and strong. Do you remember the PROTECT Act,
Sara?8 You grew very strong. Perhaps that is why the Supreme
2. See, e.g., KATE STITH & Jost A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING
GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 38 (1998) (tracing origins of the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984 ("SRA") to a 1975 dinner party hosted by Senator Kennedy).
3. Specifically, the SRA became law on October 12, 1984, as part of an omnibus con-
tinuing appropriations measure. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§
3551-3586 (2006 & Supp. III 2009)); see also Paul J. Hofer et al., U.S. Sentencing Comm'n,
FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING 3 (2004) [hereinafter FIFTEEN YEARS
REPORT], available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research/ResearchPublications/2004/15_year-
studylindex.cfm.
4. See MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 73 (1996) (noting that within two
years of the SRA's passage, "more than 200 district judges invalidated the guidelines and
all or part of the Sentencing Reform Act" (internal citation omitted)); Gregory C. Sisk, et
al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reason-
ing, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1403, 1435 tbl.5 (noting that 179 district court judges invali-
dated the Guidelines less than one year after passage).
5. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (upholding the constitu-
tionality of the SRA, the U.S. Sentencing Commission, and the Guidelines).
6. See, e.g., Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 85-91, 100 (1996) (considering the
convictions of two Los Angeles Police Department officers convicted in the Rodney King
beating incident and holding that whether a given sentencing factor was a legitimate
ground for departure was a factual matter to be determined by the sentencing judge, sub-
ject to an abuse of discretion standard on appellate review). It was suggested by some that
Koon was responsible for a decrease in the rate of within-Guidelines sentences imposed.
See infra notes 215-18 and accompanying text.
7. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES
v. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 51 fig.1 (2006) [hereinafter BOOKER REPORT] (depict-
ing 1991-2003 rates of within-Guidelines sentences above sixty percent and rates that
were either within-Guidelines or pursuant to a section 5K1.1 motion that were above eigh-
ty percent), available at http://www.ussc.govlbookerreport/BookerReport.pdf.
8. The Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children
Today (PROTECT) Act of 2003, included a section entitled "Sentencing Reform" that, inter
alia, modified 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) to limit sentencing judges' ability to sentence outside the
Guidelines, and modified 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) to change the composition of the United
States Sentencing Commission from "[a]t least" three judges to "[no more than" three.
Pub. L. No. 108-21, §§ 401(b), (n)(1), 117 Stat. 668-69, 675-76 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 991). Two years later, § 3553(b) was struck down as
unconstitutional in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). In 2008, the original
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Court's decision in United States v. Blakely9 came as such a sting-
ing rebuke. You took it so badly: you ran to your room and
slammed your door.
"You want to destroy me!" you shouted petulantly.
What a drama queen!
But, Sara, your fears were well founded. Just one year later, in
United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court held that the United
States Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines") violated the Sixth
Amendment, and remedied the situation by engaging in major
surgery, excising some of your operative parts.0 Yikes!
Today, you're lucky to be alive.
Yet here you are, Sara, alive and well. You survived even Book-
er.
And you have not only survived, Sara-you've thrived. Since
you were born, more than a million people have been sentenced in
the federal system." So that makes it official: you're a big girl
now. And so on this momentous occasion, I want to reflect a bit
about where you came from (Part II), to think about what you
have become (Part III), and-finally-to ask what you'd like to be
when you grow up (Part IV).
II. ORIGINS
It has been said, Sara, that your birth was "perhaps the most
dramatic change in sentencing law and practice in our Nation's
history."12 That's quite an accolade, but it also makes me wonder:
language in 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) was restored with passage of the Judicial Administration
and Technical Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-406, § 16, 122 Stat. 4295 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2006)). For a general discussion of the Feeney Amendment, see Ste-
phanos Bibas, The Feeney Amendment and the Continuing Rise of Prosecutorial Power to
Plea Bargain, 94 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295 (2004).
9. 542 U.S. 296, 305, 308-11 (2004) (invalidating Washington's determinate sentenc-
ing scheme to the extent that maximum penalties are determined based on facts not prov-
en by a jury).
10. See 543 U.S. 220, 245-48 (2008) (remedying the Guidelines' constitutional defect
by stripping the provisions of the SRA that made the Guidelines mandatory).
11. Commission Press Release, supra note 1.
12. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: Principal Features
Affecting Guideline Construction (Simplification Draft Paper), http://www.usse.gov/SIM
PLE/sra.htm (last updated Mar. 11, 2003).
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From where did that kind of unprecedented change come? What
was your genesis?
Your legislative history is well documented elsewhere," but it
is worth noting that you were a piece of bipartisan legislation.
The product of a mixed marriage, you had parents from both
sides of the aisle, and accordingly, you had to embody the sen-
tencing philosophies of those numerous supporters. Although you
rejected rehabilitation as the legitimate sole rationale for impri-
soning someone,1 you embody each of the cardinal philosophies of
punishment-retribution," deterrence,16 incapacitation," and re-
habilitation' 5 -without favoring one over another." Using slightly
13. See generally Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The
Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223
(1993) (tracing legislative history of SRA); Kenneth R. Feinberg, Federal Criminal Sen-
tencing Reform: Congress and the United States Sentencing Commission, 28 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 291 (1993) (same).
14. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (2006) ("The Commission shall insure that the guidelines
reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for the
purpose of rehabilitating the defendant or providing the defendant with needed educa-
tional or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment.").
15. See generally JEAN HAMPTON, The Retributive Idea, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY
111 (Jeffrie Murphy & Jean Hampton eds., 1988) (describing the retributive basis of pu-
nishment); HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 37-39 (1968)
(same); RICHARD G. SINGER, JUST DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON EQUALITY AND DESERT
14-18 (1979) (same); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, THE COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF
INCARCERATION, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 54-55 (Northeastern Un-
iv. Press 1986) (same). But see Charlton T. Lewis, The Indeterminate Sentence, 9 YALE L.J.
17, 19 (1899) (suggesting that determinate sentences tied to desert are "but organized
lynch law").
16. See generally PACKER, supra note 15, at 39-48 (exploring deterrence at a basis of
punishment); FRANKLIN R. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE (1973) (same);
Johannes Andenaes, The Morality of Deterrence, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 649 (1970) (same);
Panel on Research on Deterrent and Incapacitative Effects, Deterrence, in DETERRENCE
AND INCAPACITATION 19 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds. 1978); Ernest Van Den Haag, The
Criminal Law as a Threat System, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 769 (1982) (same).
17. See generally PETER GREENWOOD & ALAN ABRAHAMSE, SELECTIVE INCAPACI-
TATION (1982) (describing incapacitative basis of punishment); PACKER, supra note 15, at
48-53 (same); Panel on Research on Deterrent and Incapacitive Effects, Incapacitation, in
INCAPACITATION AND DETERRENCE, supra note 16, at 64-80 (same); Note, Selective Incapa-
citation: Reducing Crime Through Predictions of Recidivism, 96 HARV. L. REV. 511, 512
(1982) (same).
18. See generally FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL
(1981) (describing rehabilative basis of punishment); FRANCIS T. CULLEN & KAREN E.
GILBERT, REAFFIRMING REHABILITATION (1982) (same); PACKER, supra note 15, at 53-58
(same).
19. See Paul J. Hofer & Mark Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and
Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19, 29
(2003) ("The SRA ... mandates a comprehensive, hybrid philosophy that accommodates
all four of the traditional purposes of sentencing. But the SRA does not specify priorities
among these purposes . . . ."); Aaron J. Rappaport, Unprincipled Punishment: The United
[Vol. 45:693696
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different language, you enumerate all of them in the United
States Code:
FACTORS To BE CONSIDERED IN IMPOSING A SENTENCE.-The court
shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to
comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsec-
tion. The court, in determining the particular sentence to be im-
posed, shall consider-
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
and characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed-
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote
respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for
the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defen-
dant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment in the most effective manner ... .20
Sometimes these cornerstone goals of punishment harmonize
neatly. For example, in a case in which an offender is placed on
probation, the partial deprivation of his liberty interests repays
the debt he owes society (retribution), deters him from commit-
ting the crime again (specific deterrence), deters others like him
from committing the crime (general deterrence), reduces his op-
portunity to commit the crime again (incapacitation), and pro-
vides him with necessary training, treatment, and guidance to
reduce the likelihood of his reoffending (rehabilitation). But
sometimes the four goals of punishment are incommensurable,21
such as in the case of corporal or capital punishment. For exam-
ple, executing offenders yields top marks on measures of retribu-
States Sentencing Commission's Troubling Silence About the Purposes of Punishment, 6
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1043, 1071-77 (2003).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(2) (2006).
21. See Christopher Slobogin, Introduction to the Symposium on the Model Penal
Code's Sentencing Proposals, 61 FLA. L. REV. 665, 679-80 (2009) (noting that desert and
crime control often "are at odds, not just because a dangerous person might not be blame-
worthy (or vice versa), but because characteristics that appear mitigating-youth, addic-
tion, impaired functioning-are frequently risk factors").
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tion, specific deterrence, and incapacitation, 22 but results in fail-
ing marks on conventional measures of rehabilitation.23
Sara, perhaps you incorporate all of these theories simply be-
cause of when you were born.
Perhaps you are what you are because of when you were born-
sort of like being born as a Libra.24 After all, you were conceived
at a moment in U.S. history when the belief in indeterminate sen-
tencing yielded to the belief in determinate sentencing. Is it mere
coincidence that Robert Martinson published his infamous "What
Works?" article (thereby sounding the death knell for the rehabi-
litative movement in the United States)25 just one year before
Senator Kennedy launched the legislative initiative that would
culminate in your passage?26 I think not. Rather, I think that pe-
nology and attendant sentencing practices were changing, and
that both Martinson's article and Kennedy's initiative tapped into
that shifting zeitgeist. 27
22. See David McCord, Imagining a Retributivist Alternative to Capital Punishment,
50 FLA. L. REV. 1, 4, 27 (1998) ("Death is the surest incapacitation: it eliminates the possi-
bility of the defendant murdering again while inside prison walls, and in the outside world
should the defendant ever be on the loose again due to parole, executive clemency, or es-
cape. LWOP [life imprisonment without the possibility of parole] is a potent, but not per-
fect substitute for death: LWOP negates the possibility of parole, but cannot assure
against the defendant's murdering while inside the prison, or after receiving executive
clemency, or escaping.").
23. But see C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, in CONTEMPORARY
PUNISHMENT 194, 197-98 (Rudolph J. Gerber & Patrick D. McAnany eds., 1972) (arguing
that one has a right to be punished for one's actions). Under such a view, execution may be
a necessary act of expiation, required in order to rehabilitate a soul. See id.
24. Sara is a Libra. The SRA was signed into law by President Reagan on October 12,
1984. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987, 1987.
25. See Robert Martinson, What Works?-Questions and Answers about Prison
Reform, PUB. INT., Spring 1974, at 22, 22-25 (concluding from a review of 231 studies that
rehabilitative programs did not significantly reduce rates of recidivism). But see Robert
Martinson, New Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution Regarding Sentencing Reform, 7
HOFSTRA L. REV. 243, 254 (1979) (recanting his "nothing works" findings by writing, "I
withdraw this conclusion. I have often said that treatment added to the network of crimi-
nal justice is 'impotent,' and I withdraw this characterization as well." (footnote omitted)).
For a discussion of Martinson's life and work, see SASHA ABRAMSKY, AMERICAN FURIES
43-53 (2007).
26. STITH & CABRAMES, supra note 2, at 38 (describing Senator Kennedy's 1975 din-
ner party).
27. See Antony Duff & David Garland, Introduction: Thinking about Punishment, in A
READER ON PUNISHMENT 1, 10 (Antony Duff & David Garland eds., 1994) (describing the
change in views about sentencing as "a larger reaction against the consequentialist men-
tality and the kind of social engineering which often accompanied it").
[Vol. 45:693698
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Of course, the zeitgeist had been shifting for a long time. Co-
lonial sentences had been almost entirely determinate,"2 but
throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
compassion and economic pragmatism had converged to make in-
determinate sentencing very popular.29
In 1870, New York became the first state to utilize an indetermi-
nate-sentencing system. By 1922, all but four states and the federal
government employed some type of indeterminate sentencing or used
the parole system which functioned in the same way. By the 1960s,
every state had an indeterminate-sentencing structure or some vari-
ation.o
Under the indeterminate model of sentencing that dominated
the United States landscape between 193031 and the 1970s, pu-
nishment was related to utilitarian concerns of crime control,
through deterrence, incapacitation, and, notably, rehabilitation.3 2
Indeed, for much of the early twentieth century, crime was
28. Sentences were almost entirely prescribed by colonial laws, and judges had little
or no discretion to modify the punishment called for by the law. See SANDRA SHANE-
DUBOW ET AL., SENTENCING REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (1985).
29. Compassion played a role in the rise of indeterminate sentencing. The Quaker re-
former Benjamin Rush advocated abandoning determinate sentencing. He wrote that "the
kinds of punishments that might be employed should be specified by law but their dura-
tion should not be fixed, save as a possible maximum. The limitations of punishment in
specific cases within the prison should not be known to the prisoners." STITH & CABRANES,
supra note 2, at 16 (quoting O.F. LEWIS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN PRISONS AND
PRISON CUSTOMS 1776-1845, at 22 (1922)). The uncertainty of punishment would lead
prisoners to assume the worst (e.g., the longest punishments for even the smallest crimes),
and this, in turn, would lead prisoners to behave their best. But economics played a signif-
icant role in the rise of indeterminate sentencing, too. In the early part of the nineteenth
century, officials began to use pardons and "good time" as mechanisms of efficiency to con-
trol prison overcrowding. See William J. Powell & Michael J. Cimino, Prosecutorial Discre-
tion under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Is the Fox Guarding the Hen House? 97 W.
VA. L. REV. 373, 376 (1995) (citing SHANE-DUBOW, supra note 28, at 3). Powell and Cimino
note that
(t]o relieve the overcrowding and to make room for new inmates, the use of
pardons became widespread. For example, the young state of Ohio "simply
pardoned convicts whenever the population rose above 120 in number." Prob-
lems with the pardon system, however, including bribery and extortion, led
New York to adopt the nation's first "good time" computation law in 1817.
Id. (quoting SHANE-DUBOW, supra note 28, at 4). The federal government began reducing
sentences for good conduct in 1867. See PETER B. HOFFMAN, U.S. PAROLE COMM'N,
HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL PAROLE SYSTEM 5 (2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/
uspc/history.pdf.
30. Powell & Cimino, supra note 29, at 378 (footnotes omitted).
31. See TONRY, supra note 4, at 7 (noting that "the broad outlines of indeterminate
sentencing had been the same everywhere since 1930").
32. See ALLEN, supra note 18, at 18-19 (describing popular appeal of rehabilitation).
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viewed as a disease, and one that could be cured.33 It was believed
that criminals were dynamic actors and could change, if only
judges, prison wardens, and probation officers tried hard enough.
In contrast, retribution seemed like a backward and unenligh-
tened basis for punishment. Even the Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States had affirmatively proclaimed, "Retribution is no longer
the dominant objective of the criminal law." 3
By the mid-twentieth century, Sara, sentencing systems were
conferring tremendous discretion upon parole boards.35 One con-
sequence of this was that offenders convicted of equivalent of-
fenses sometimes served disparate sentences.36 Judges were free
to sentence defendants to any term authorized by the penal code,
for nearly any reason-even for no reason whatsoever.37 By the
early 1970s, some critics began to condemn the horror stories
about identical offenders before different judges, one who received
a sentence of probation while the other was sentenced to impri-
sonment.38 Judge Marvin Frankel condemned this kind of dispari-
ty as "judicial lawlessness" in 1972,"' and soon thereafter, the re-
33. See, e.g., KARL MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT 257 (1968) (suggesting
that some forms of crime are indications of an underlying illness that can be healed);
BERTRAND RUSSELL, PROPOSED ROADS TO FREEDOM 125 (1919) ("When a man is suffering
from an infectious disease he is a danger to the community, and it is necessary to restrict
his liberty of movement. But no one associates any idea of guilt with such a situation. On
the contrary, he is an object of commiseration to his friends. Such steps as science recom-
mends are taken to cure him of his disease, and he submits as a rule without reluctance to
the curtailment of liberty involved meanwhile. The same method in spirit ought to be
shown in the treatment of what is called 'crime."'); BARBARA WOOTTON, SOCIAL SCIENCE
AND SOCIAL PATHOLOGY 306, 325 (1959) (advocating the renunciation of conceptions of
blameworthiness and its replacement with a system in which experts predict future crimi-
nality and treat it with therapy).
34. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949), superseded by statute, Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1988, 1989 (codified in scattered sections
of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
35. See DAVID ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE 173 (1980) (describing pa-
role decisions in the early twentieth century being made on unreviewable, personal bases).
36. Williams, 337 U.S. at 247 ("The belief no longer prevails that every offense in a
like legal category calls for an identical punishment without regard to the past life and
habits of a particular offender.").
37. Id. at 252 (noting that "no federal constitutional objection would have been possi-
ble if the ... judge had sentenced him to death giving no reason at all").
38. See Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Beyond Blakely, 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 316,
318-19 (2004).
39. See Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1972)
("The scope of what we call 'discretion' permits imprisonment from anything from a day to
one, five, 10, 20 or more years. All would presumably join in denouncing a statute that
said 'the judge may impose any sentence he pleases.' Given the morality of men, the power
to set a man free or confine him for up to 30 years is not sharply distinguishable." (foot-
700 [Vol. 45:693
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tributive calls for parity and predictability began to drown out the
rehabilitative charge for transformation.4o
Interest in determinate sentencing quickly increased.41 Under
determinate sentencing, rooted in the deontological philosophies
of rights and retribution,42 there is little interest in the offender's
capacity to change. Sentences are meant to redress past wrongs,
after all, not to influence future conduct.43 If a criminal should
undergo a prison conversion, that might be a happy side effect,
but the conversion is irrelevant for purposes of retributive sen-
tencing."4 Offenders are punished for the crimes they committed,
not for who they become while incarcerated.
note omitted)); see also MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES 103 (1972) (critiquing
existing sentencing practices).
40. See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review,
87 CAL. L. REV. 943, 978-81 (1999). Kadish describes the California legislature's commit-
ment to a retributive theory of punishment:
California .. . had been at the forefront of states committed to individualized
and rehabilitative punishment. In 1976, the legislature replaced its elaborate
system of indeterminate sentencing with a determinate sentencing law that
opened with this ringing commitment: "The Legislature finds and declares
that the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment."
Id. at 980 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West 1998)). The transition away from
a rehabilitation-dominant penology may have been aided by observations that treatment,
while benevolent, is not without its tyrannies. See, e.g., THOMAS S. SZAsZ, LAW, LIBERTY,
AND PSYCHIATRY 17, 184-85 (1963) (arguing that mental illness is a myth and suggesting
that state-mandated treatment is no less an assault upon personal liberty than criminal
punishment).
41. See Samuel H. Pillsbury, Understanding Penal Reform: The Dynamic of Change,
80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 726, 751 (1989) (describing the ascendance of determinate
sentencing between 1976 and 1989).
42. See id. ("As with the reform movements already considered, the determinate sen-
tencing movement began with a new vision of penal justice. Idealist reformers promoted
an ideology of rights which justified punishment on a retributive, deontological basis in-
stead of utilitarian principles.").
43. Allen S. Olmstead, "Suppose We Change the Subject," FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1964,
at 10, 12 ("Is it justice to punish one man in order to influence the conduct of other men?").
44. See, e.g., United States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. 496, 499-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
The court noted that it
agrees that this defendant should not be sent to prison for "rehabilitation."
Apart from the patent inappositeness of the concept to this individual, this
court shares the growing understanding that no one should ever be sent to
prison for rehabilitation. That is to say, nobody who would not otherwise be
locked up should suffer that fate on the incongruous premise that it will be
good for him or her. . . . If someone must be imprisoned-for other, valid rea-
sons-we should seek to make rehabilitative resources available to him or
her. But the goal of rehabilitation cannot fairly serve in itself as grounds for
the sentence to confinement.
Id. at 498-99.
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The dominant philosophy of punishment was changing. Just as
the prison was evolving from a place of mere detention, to a place
of penitence and rehabilitation, back into a place of warehousing
and detention, 4 sentencing, too, was getting back to basics.
It was at this moment that you were conceived, Sara. At this
moment you began your process of maturation. No wonder your
parents placed such a premium on the reduction of unwarranted
sentencing disparity."6
As you know, when you were born, federal parole was abolished
prospectively.47 That, alone, did a great deal to root out dispari-
ty.48 At the same time, the Commission was formed and charged
with the development and promulgation of the Guidelines."9 In-
deed, it has been said that the primary goal of the Guidelines was
the reduction of unwarranted sentencing disparity.50
But the Guidelines have not realized their promise, and many
commentators have condemned them as a failure.51 Yes, the
Guidelines achieved some of the goals announced at your birth,52
45. See J.C. Oleson, Comment, The Punitive Coma, 90 CAL. L. REV. 829, 836-43 (2002)
(chronicling the evolution of the prison from a place of mere detention, to its use as a place
of rehabilitation, back to a place of mere detention).
46. See FIFTEEN YEARS REPORT, supra note 3, at 79 ("Eliminating unwarranted sen-
tencing disparity was the primary goal of the Sentencing Reform Act.").
47. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 218(a)(4), 98 Stat. 1987,
2027 (repealing 18 U.S.C. § 4161 (1982)).
48. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 2, at 114 (noting that "elimination of parole by
itself . . ., quite apart from any effect of the Guidelines, can be expected to reduce sentenc-
ing variation").
49. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2006).
50. See Feinberg, supra note 13, at 295 ("The first and foremost goal of the sentencing
reform effort was to alleviate the perceived problem of federal criminal sentencing dispari-
ty.").
51. See, e.g., ToNRY, supra note 4, at 73 ("Possibly the best evidence that the federal
sentencing guidelines have been a policy failure comes from the experiences of other juris-
dictions that have appointed sentencing commissions."); Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentenc-
ing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101
YALE L.J. 1681, 1685 (1992) (noting that "the federal sentencing guidelines are not suc-
ceeding"); Jos6 A. Cabranes, Sentencing Guidelines: A Dismal Failure, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 11,
1992, at 2 ("[T'he sentencing guidelines system is a failure-a dismal failure, a fact well
known and fully understood by virtually everyone who is associated with the federal judi-
cial system."); AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES
2004: AN EXPERIMENT THAT HAS FAILED 35 (2004), http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.
cfm?Section=AllPublications&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentFilelD=58
('Twenty years after the enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act, the current sentencing
system is fundamentally flawed. While the goal of eliminating unfair disparity in federal
sentences was laudable, the Guidelines themselves are an experiment that failed.").
52. See FIFTEEN YEARS REPORT, supra note 3, at 136-46 (describing "[s]ubstantially
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but the reformation of the federal criminal justice system did not
occur as planned,@1 and the elusive utopia of the sentencer's
dreams remains unrealized.
In fact, the cure may have been worse than the disease.5
III. IMPLEMENTATION
You know, Sara, that the Commission has been dismissed by
many commentators as ineffectual,66 and you know that the
Guidelines are the object of widespread scorn.5 6 But this is rather
strange. After all, guideline sentencing has been successful in
many states that have adopted it.67 The guidelines in North Caro-
lina, for example, have been hailed as "the exemplar of smart po-
litical and rational reform"@5 and the guidelines in Minnesota
have been enthusiastically replicated by other states."
It seems like the Guidelines should have worked. In 1984, the
Commission possessed all the raw materials it needed to develop
a set of guidelines that were as good as or better than those em-
ployed by the states: the backing of Congress, adequate time, and
[a]chieved [g]oals of the SRA," "[p]artially [a]chieved [gloals of the SRA," and "[p]artial
[ilmplementation of the [c]omponents of [slentencing [rieform").
53. See id. at 144 ("In practice, the reformed sentencing system has fallen short of this
ideal [of uniform treatment across all stages in the criminal justice system] in several re-
spects, which helps explain why the goals of sentencing reform have been only partially
achieved.").
54. See Gerald F. Uelmen, Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Cure Worse Than the
Disease, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 899, 899 (1992).
55. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 757
(2005) ("[T]he U.S. Sentencing Commission is universally recognized to be an ineffectual
agency....").
56. See, e.g., TONRY, supra note 4, at 11 ("Few outside the federal commission would
disagree that the federal guidelines have been a disaster."); Erik Luna, Misguided Guide-
lines: A Critique of Federal Sentencing 23 (Cato Inst. Policy Analysis, Paper No. 458,
2002), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa458.pdf. ("There are many possible
paths to positive change, all leading to the dissolution of the commission and the repeal of
its Guidelines.").
57. See TONRY, supra note 4, at 25 ('The [state] sentencing commission is alive and
well."); Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unre-
solved Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1192-94 (2005).
58. DANIEL F. WILHELM & NICHOLAS R. TURNER, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, IS THE
BUDGET CRISIS CHANGING THE WAY WE LOOK AT SENTENCING AND INCARCERATION? 7
(2002), available at http://www.vera.org/download?File=269/IIB%2BBudget%2Bcrisis.pdf.
59. Richard S. Frase, Blakely in Minnesota, Two Years Out: Guidelines Sentencing Is
Alive and Well, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 73, 94 (2006).
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ample resources. 60 So why is it said, Sara, that "[t]he U.S. com-
mission's guidelines are easily the most disliked sentencing
reform initiative in the United States in this [twentieth] cen-
tury"?61
The answer to that question is complicated. In truth, there are
probably a host of causes that, considered in combination, may
explain the unpopularity of the Guidelines.
Many of these causes can be traced to the inception of the
Commission. In addition to the not-insignificant logistical chal-
lenge of establishing a federal agency from scratch, the Commis-
sion was immediately beset by fundamental disagreements about
sentencing philosophies. 6 2 One of the founding commissioners re-
signed in protest;63 one dissented from the promulgation of the
Guidelines;64 and the ex officio member from the Department of
Justice indicated that had he been a voting member, he would
have voted against approving the Guidelines, too. 65 The initial
staff director-one of the only people at the Commission with any
prior experience with sentencing guidelines-resigned within one
year.66 In fact, by the time the Government Accountability Office
(then called the General Accounting Office) published its evalua-
tion of the Commission in 1990,67 the Commission had had four
60. See TONRY, supra note 4, at 11.
61. Id. at 25.
62. See Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 19, at 31 ("For the first eighteen months of its
existence, the Commission debated and drafted competing versions of the Guidelines, each
built on fundamentally different philosophies.").
63. See Paula Yost, Sentencing Panel Member Resigns Over Research, WASH. POST,
Aug. 23, 1989, at A25 (noting that Commissioner Michael K. Block resigned because of "a
lack of commitment by commissioners to base decisions on research and scientific data
when amending sentencing guidelines").
64. See Dissenting View of Commissioner Paul H. Robinson on the Promulgation of
Sentencing Guidelines by the United States Sentencing Commission, 52 Fed. Reg. 18,121,
18,121-22, 18,132 (May 18, 1987) [hereinafter Robinson Dissent] (condemning the enacted
guidelines and dissenting from their promulgation). Commissioner Robinson ultimately
resigned. Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 19, at 31.
65. See Robinson Dissent, supra note 64, at 18,121 (observing that ex-officio Commis-
sioner Ronald L. Gainer asked the Commission to note in its publication of the guidelines
that "'if he were a voting Commissioner, as a personal matter, he would not have voted to
support the guidelines in their current form').
66. See TONRY, supra note 4, at 84-85 (describing Kay Knapp's tenure).
67. See U.S. Sentencing Commission: Changes Needed to Improve Effectiveness: Before
the Subcomm. On Criminal Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 2-3
(1990) [hereinafter U.S.S.C. Hearings] (Statement of Lowell Dodge, Director, Administra-
tion of Justice Issues), available at http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat11/140806.pdf (attributing
the Commission's failure to meet key deadlines to several factors related to "organization-
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staff directors or executive directors and one interim staff director
over a four-year period.6 8 Similarly, "[g]eneral counsels to the
commission came and went at the same rate in the early years."69
The research director's position languished, vacant for a year and
a half,70 and was later abolished.7' Those who joined the Commis-
sion thinking they could change it, or even endure it, often left
broken and dismayed. 72 Susceptibility to congressional action
made the already politicized situation worse.7 3
al disarray," including, inter alia, lack of planning, unclear lines of authority, lack of coor-
dination between commissioner research initiatives, and frequent vacancies and personnel
turnover in key positions).
68. See id. at 14 ("In 4 years the Commission has had four staff directors or executive
directors and one interim staff director.").
69. TONRY, supra note 4, at 85.
70. See U.S.S.C. Hearings, supra note 67, at 15 ('The research director's position has
been vacant for over a year and a half.... [P]art of the problem has been finding qualified
candidates who would be willing to take the position, given perceptions that the working
environment is complicated by commissioner involvement in research and other mat-
ters.").
71. See TONRY, supra note 4, at 85 (noting that "qualified research directors proved
elusive and the position was finally abolished").
72. See id. ("One nationally prominent researcher joined the research staff in the face
of warnings from friends; she explained that things at the commission had gotten so bad
that they were bound to improve and she would be starting work as the commission re-
bounded. She quit within months, reporting that the environment steadily worsened dur-
ing her tenure. Another nationally prominent researcher, an experienced senior civil ser-
vant, pooh-poohed friends' warnings about the commission; he explained that he was
accustomed to working effectively within politicized federal agencies and was a political
survivor. He survived for a year before he too was driven out by internal commission poli-
tics.").
73. See Barkow, supra note 55, at 765 ("When the Supreme Court upheld the Sentenc-
ing Commission against separation of powers challenges in Mistretta v. United States, it
characterized the agency as an 'expert body' engaged in an 'essentially neutral endeavor.'
The image of the Sentencing Commission as an independent agency, divorced from poli-
tics, was a strong one. . . . [Diespite this description[,] . . . the Sentencing Commission was
a highly politicized agency from the outset. Then-Judge Stephen Breyer, one of the initial
members of the Commission, wrote that the Commission reached certain compromises in
its initial set of guidelines because 'the Commission was appointed by politically responsi-
ble officials and is therefore, at least to some degree, a 'political' body.' Michael Tonry has
put it more starkly: 'The U.S. commission . . . made no effort to insulate its policies from
law-and-order politics and short-term emotions."' (footnotes omitted)); see also Michael K.
Block, Emerging Problems in the Sentencing Commission's Approach to Guideline
Amendments, 1 FED. SEN'G REP. 451, 453 (1989) ("Congress created the Commission to
rationalize the overall sentencing system to the practical end of improving the effective-
ness of criminal punishment. In enacting the legislation that created the Commission,
Congress specifically warned against drawing inferences about relative severity of offenses
from statutory maximum provisions, and called upon the Commission to assist in rationa-
lizing those provisions as well. The most troubling aspect of the 'signaling' argument is not
merely that it is wrong, but that such an erroneous argument, without supporting any
analysis, carried the day with a majority of the Commission. Basing guideline amend-
ments on vague arguments like 'signaling' abdicates our responsibility to rationalize sen-
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The Commission, unlike Disneyland, was apparently not the
happiest place on earth.
There is an old joke about university politics being so fierce be-
cause the stakes are so low. In many ways, Sara, the newly
formed Commission seemed like an acrimonious university de-
partment, except that its stakes were enormous: the punishment
of thousands of people every year.74
Those contentious politics may explain the Guidelines that ul-
timately emerged. Because initial disagreements about the phi-
losophy of the Guidelines led to impasse75 and delayed their de-
velopment76 and because suggestions to defer and field test the
Guidelines were dismissed," the Guidelines that were eventually
promulgated were rushed and cobbled together using features
from inconsonant models.
tencing and turns upside down the institutional arrangement Congress created."(footnote
omitted)).
74. UTILIZATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS PROJECT, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS: DEFENDANTS SENTENCED IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS
tbl.5.23.2007 (Kathleen Maguire ed., 2007), available at http://www.albany.edu/source
book/pdflt5232007.pdf (documenting the number of defendants sentenced between 1945
and 2007, ranging annually in the thousands, from a low of 12,415 in 1970 to a high of
67,257 in 2006).
75. See Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 19, at 33.
76. See Ilene H. Nagel, Foreword, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 918-19 (1990) (describing the
Commission's efforts to reconcile "two sets of theoretically orthodox guidelines: one adher-
ing to the principles of just deserts, and one to the principles of crime control" as an "ab-
ysmal failure"). The promulgated Guidelines were developed between July 1986 and April
1987. See id. at 921, 939.
77. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 2, at 58 (describing Chairman Wilkins's men-
tion of delaying the implementation of the Guidelines as being rebuffed by Representative
Lungren as resulting in "continued undue leniency" in sentencing).
78. See Andrew von Hirsch, Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The United States and
Canadian Schemes Compared, IV OCCASIONAL PAPERS FROM THE CENTER FOR RESEARCH
IN CRIME AND JUSTICE, N.Y.U. SCHOOL OF LAW 2 (1988) ("Shortly after the commissioners
were appointed, however, problems began to be apparent. A first draft of the guidelines
was written in the spring of 1986 by one of the commissioners, and then jettisoned. The
next two drafts emanated from the Chairman's office, were circulated for public comment,
and then abandoned after an unfavorable response. It was only in the winter of 1987 that
other commissioners were drawn actively into the process. The final draft was written at a
late date in some haste to meet the submission deadline."). But see Nagel, supra note 76,
at 922 ("This agreement represented not a hastily formulated idea, nor a night-before-
they-were-due idea, but rather the natural culmination of an evolutionary process where-
by three previous drafts of varying structures had been evaluated, assessed, tested, re-
vised, and refined. . . .").
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The problems with the Guidelines have been described else-
where, 79 but I would suggest, Sara, that the Guidelines are the ob-
ject of derision because they are too severe," too complicated,",
and too rigid.82
A. Three Flaws of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
1. Severity
One common complaint about the Guidelines is that they are
too harsh. 3 Although Congress intended federal penalties for
some offenses to be more severe than what judges had historically
imposed, and said so when you were born,1 there's little doubt
that sentences associated with crimes charged under federal ju-
risdiction are dramatically longer than equivalent crimes charged
79. See generally STITH & CABRANES, supra note 2; TONRY, supra note 4; Luna, supra
note 56.
80. See infra Part III.A.1 (describing severity of the Guidelines).
81. See infra Part III.A.2 (describing complexity of the Guidelines).
82. See infra Part III.A.3 (describing rigidity of the Guidelines).
83. See, e.g., Marvin E. Frankel & Leonard Orland, A Conversation about Sentencing
Commissions and Guidelines, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 655, 655-61 (1993) ("I argue that
harshness imposed by a sentencing commission is far worse than idiosyncratic harsh sen-
tences imposed in an age of discretion because a guideline system imposes harshness as a
rule of law."). But see Paul G. Cassell, Too Severe? A Defense of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines (and a Critique of Federal Mandatory Minimums), 56 STAN. L. REV. 1017, 1020
(2004) (arguing that the guidelines approximate public moral intuitions about punish-
ment).
84. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (2006) (directing Commission to formulate guidelines "at or
near the maximum" for third or subsequent federal drug trafficking offense or "crime of
violence"); id. § 994(m) ("The Commission shall insure that the guidelines reflect the fact
that, in many cases, current sentences do not accurately reflect the seriousness of the of-
fense."). The Senate Committee on the Judiciary concurred in a 1983 report on the SRA:
It is not intended that the Sentencing Commission necessarily continue to fol-
low the average sentencing practices . . . . The Commission might conclude
that a category of offenders, for example, first offenders convicted of a partic-
ular nonviolent offense that did not involve substantial harm to the victim,
were too frequently sentenced to terms of imprisonment, and that for many of
them a term of probation might sufficiently carry out the punishment, deter-
rence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation purposes necessary .... On the oth-
er hand, the Commission might conclude that a category of major white collar
criminals too frequently was sentenced to probation or too short a term of
imprisonment because judges using the old rehabilitation theory of sentenc-
ing, did not believe such offenders needed to be rehabilitated and, therefore,
saw no need for incarceration. The Commission might conclude that such a
category of offenders should serve a term of imprisonment, or a longer term
than currently served, for purposes of punishment and deterrence.
S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 177 (1983).
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in state courts. For example, the aggregate mean maximum sen-
tence length for all felonies is thirty-seven months in state pris-
ons, but is sixty-one months in federal prisons.5 For drug of-
fenses, state sentences average thirty-one months in length while
federal sentences average eighty-four months;6 for weapons of-
fenses, state sentences average thirty-two months in length while
federal sentences average eighty-four months.87 This is not be-
cause of substantive differences between state and federal
crimes-that nostalgic era in which federal jurisdiction was re-
stricted to interstate crimes (e.g., Mann Act violations) and of-
fenses directly involving the federal government (e.g., treason,
counterfeiting, and mail fraud) is long gone.88 Today, federal ju-
risdiction extends to numerous crimes with no obvious federal
nexus, 9 including offenses such as dealing drugs,90 loansharking,91
and carjacking.92 In fact, Sara, Congress has passed so many fed-
eral crimes that no one actually knows how many there are.93 Yet
while we don't know how many crimes there are, we do know that
the penalties for federal crimes are generally much tougher than
those for equivalent state offenses.
Sometimes the choice between state and federal prosecution is
arbitrary94 and sometimes strategic,95 but the reality is that one
85. See MATHEW R. DUROSE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, STATE COURT
SENTENCING OF CONVICTED FELONS, 2004-STATISTICAL TABLES, COMPARISON OF FELONY
CONVICTIONS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, 2004 tbil.10 (2007), available at http://bjs.
ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/html/scscf04/tables/scsO4ll0tab.cfm (depicting mean maximum
sentence length imposed in state and federal courts in 2004).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. JAMES A. STRAZZELLA, AM. BAR ASS'N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, THE
FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 7 (1998).
89. But see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566-67 (1995) (striking down the
federal Gun-Free School Zones Act because the effects on interstate commerce were too
attenuated to justify federal authority).
90. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2006)
91. 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-896 (2006).
92. Id. § 2119.
93. STRAZZELLA, supra note 88, at 9, 91-93 ("So large is the present body of federal
criminal law that there is no conveniently accessible, complete list of federal crimes.");
JOHN S. BAKER, JR., THE FEDERALIST Soc'Y FOR LAW AND PUB. POLICY STUDIES,
MEASURING THE EXPLOSIVE GROWTH OF FEDERAL CRIME LEGISLATION 3-5 (2004), availa-
ble at http://fedsoc.server326.com/Publications/practicegroupnewsletters/criminallawlcrim
reportfinal.pdf (identifying obstacles in counting crimes and estimating the existence of
more than four thousand federal crimes).
94. See William Anderson & Candice E. Jackson, Washington's Biggest Crime Prob-
lem, REASON, Apr. 1, 2004, at 41, available at http://www.reason.com/archives/2004/04/01/
Washingtons-biggest-crime-prob ("When Rudolph Giuliani was the U.S. attorney for the
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offender may be charged in state court for cultivating marijuana
and receive a $1,000 fine (waived because he's indigent) while his
partner, charged in federal court for the identical crime, may re-
ceive ten years in prison and eight years of postconviction super-
vised release. 6 Offenders sentenced under the Guidelines serve
much longer sentences than offenders punished for equivalent
criminal conduct in state courts and offenders punished for
equivalent crimes in many foreign jurisdictions.7
Isn't it ironic that your birth, which was supposed to reduce
sentencing disparity, may have narrowed intra-federal dispari-
ty," but simultaneously created vast extra-federal disparity?
How did this happen? Well, at your birth, when Congress
called for more severe sentences in some cases," the Commission
interpreted the requirement as a call for more severe sentences in
more cases,100 and acted accordingly. The Guidelines were estab-
Southern District of New York in the 1980s, he implemented an anti-drug policy he called
'Federal Day.' On a different day each week, all drug offenders arrested and charged that
day were prosecuted in federal court. Thus a crack cocaine offender arrested on Monday,
say, would face a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence, while a crack offender arrested
on Tuesday that same week would face perhaps 18 to 20 months of prison time under state
law.").
95. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr. & John Gleeson, The Federalization of Organized
Crime: Advantages of Federal Prosecution, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1095, 1103, 1119 (1995) (not-
ing that "federal prosecutors can conduct organized crime investigations more quickly,
bring more charges, and win more convictions than state and local authorities" and sug-
gesting that "if federal prosecutors had been asked to create the sentencing regime that
would place the maximum permissible pressure on criminal defendants to cooperate with
the government, they could hardly have done better than the Sentencing Commission").
96. See Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S.
CAL. L. REV. 643, 648-49 (1997) (describing the disparate state and federal sentences for
co-conspirators Mark Brock Palmer and Jack Roberts).
97. See Clymer, supra note 96, at 647-48 (exploring key differences in state and fed-
eral sentencing regimes); Andr6 Kuhn, International Imprisonments, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 918, 925 (David Levinson ed., 2002) ("There is no doubt that the
American criminal justice system is much more punitive than the European systems.
Even allowing for differences in crime rates, sentencing severity (use of prison as a sen-
tence and length of prison sentences) is much higher in the United States than in Eu-
rope.").
98. See FIFTEEN YEARS REPORT, supra note 3, at 140 ("Rigorous statistical study both
inside and outside the Commission confirm that the guidelines have succeeded at the job
they were principally designed to do: reduce unwarranted disparity arising from differenc-
es among judges."). But see Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and
the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1424-25 (2008) ("The federal effort to stamp
out judicial disparity through the Guidelines was probably not successful.").
99. See supra note 84.
100. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENC-
ING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 18-19 (1987) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENTARY
REPORT].
2011] 709
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
lished by averaging the sentences imposed in 10,500 cases for
which the Commission had adequate presentence report data, 0'
but the Commission deviated from this approach for a number of
offense types.'0 2
Instead of allowing mandatory minimum sentences for drugs to
operate as trumps at the applicable quantity levels-the ap-
proach followed by state guidelines systems-the Commission de-
cided to peg the drug Guidelines so they were all above the man-
datory minimum terms.0 They then extrapolated that penalty
structure across other quantity levels, increasing all drug penal-
ties, including those not covered by mandatory minimums.0 4
101. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 2, at 61. The approach has been criticized. Com-
missioners Block and Robinson both condemned the approach. Block wrote that relying on
past averages allowed the Sentencing Commission to avoid developing a consistent sen-
tencing philosophy."' Jeffrey S. Parker & Michael K. Block, The Sentencing Commission,
P.M. (Post-Mistretta): Sunshine or Sunset?, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 289, 315-19 (1989) (foot-
note omitted). Robinson noted that Congress had instructed the Commission to consider
past practice but to "independently develop a sentencing range that is consistent with the
purposes of sentencing." Robinson Dissent, supra note 64, at 18, 121-22 (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(m) (2006)). Stith and Cabranes note that by relying on presentence reports and not
actual judgments, the Commission assumed that actual sentences were shaped by the pre-
sentence report factors that the Commission evaluated, and not upon factors the Commis-
sion ignored. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 2, at 61.
102. See Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 19, at 33 (noting that "the extent to which
sentences under the Guidelines actually mirror past practice has been overstated").
103. See TONRY, supra note 4, at 96-97 ("This approach, which every state sentencing
commission adopted, has the advantage that it makes clear when sentences uniquely re-
sult from application of mandatory penalty statutes.").
104. Id. It may not be possible to adequately reconcile the Guidelines and mandatory
minimum sentences. See, e.g., William W. Schwarzer, Sentencing Guidelines and Manda-
tory Minimums: Mixing Apples and Oranges, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 405-06 (1992) (identi-
fying difficulties in harmonizing sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimums). Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist noted that "one of the best arguments against any more
mandatory minimums and perhaps against some of those that we already have, is that
they frustrate the careful calibration of sentences, from one end of the spectrum to the
other, which the Sentencing Guidelines were intended to accomplish." William H. Rehn-
quist, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the U.S., Luncheon Address at the Inaugural
Symposium on Crime and Punishment in the United States (June 18, 1993), in U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, DRUGS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 283, 287 (June 16-18, 1993). Jus-
tice Stephen Breyer, one of the architects of the Guidelines, has written:
IS]tatutory mandatory sentences prevent the Commission from carrying out
its basic, congressionally mandated task: the development, in part through
research, of a rational, coherent set of punishments. .. . Every system, after
all, needs some kind of escape valve for unusual cases. . . . For this reason,
the Guideline system is a stronger, more effective sentencing system in prac-
tice. In sum, Congress, in simultaneously requiring Guideline sentencing and
mandatory minimum sentencing, is riding two different horses. And those
horses, in terms of coherence, fairness, and effectiveness, are traveling in op-
posite directions. [In my view, Congress should] abolish mandatory mini-
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Inspired by Congress's decree that "in many cases, current sen-
tences do not accurately reflect the seriousness of the offense,"10
the Commission also increased penalties-well above historical
averages-for white-collar offenses.106 Similarly, and without arti-
culating its rationale, the Commission raised penalties for violent
crimes "where the Commission was convinced that they were in-
adequate."'0 7 In fact, the categories of offenses in which the Com-
mission purposely deviated from past practice actually outnumb-
er the remaining categories of crime. 08
The result, as you already know, was that federal sentence
length increased under the Guidelines for most offenses. 09 The
number of offenders sentenced to straight probation plummeted
from thirty-three percent in 1984110 to roughly six percent in
2007."' And while that increased rate of imprisonment should
have reduced the mean sentence length (since those who pre-
viously received only probation now received a presumably short
prison sentence), sentence length actually increased.112
mums altogether.
Stephen Breyer, Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the U.S., Address at the Universi-
ty of Nebraska College of Law (Nov. 18, 1998), in 11 FED. SENT'G REP. 180, 184-85 (1999).
Of course, there is precedent for doing away with mandatory minimum sentences that fru-
strate the goals of justice. Congress has done it before. See Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1227, 1291-92 (repealing
almost all mandatory minimum drug sentences then in effect).
105. 28 U.S.C. § 994(m) (2006).
106. See SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 100, at 18.
107. Id. at 18-19.
108. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 2, at 60-61.
109. See FIFTEEN YEARS STUDY, supra note 3, at 139 ("For offenders who are impri-
soned, the length of time served has increased substantially in the guidelines era. The av-
erage time served more than doubled after implementation of the guidelines. Since 1992
there has been a slight downturn in average time served, but the typical federal offender
sentenced in 2002 will still spend almost twice as long in prison as in 1984, (the year the
SRA was enacted) increasing from an average of just under 25 months to almost 50
months."). Increased severity over time creates another kind of sentencing disparity: tem-
poral disparity. The Guidelines may have reduced the disparity between the sentencing
judge in courtroom A and the sentencing judge in courtroom B, but by deviating from past
practice, an offender convicted in year X received a different sentence than an identical
offender, convicted of an identical offense, convicted in year Y.
110. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, STAFF DISCUSSION PAPER: SENTENCING OPTIONS
UNDER THE GUIDELINES 10 (on file with author).
111. See COURTNEY SEMISCH, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING IN
THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 4 tbl.2 (2009), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
general/20090206_Alternatives.pdf (noting that 6.2% of all offenders received a sentence of
straight probation in fiscal year 2007, while 86.5% of offenders received a prison-only sen-
tence).
112. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 2, at 62 ("If the Guidelines reflected past prac-
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But such, Sara, is the way of the world. Just as iron tends to
rust when exposed to oxygen, so do sentence lengths tend to in-
crease when exposed to politics.13 Operating on a one-way rat-
chet, sentences tend to increase over time because "the story of
American criminal law is a story of tacit cooperation between
prosecutors and legislators, each of whom benefits from more and
broader crimes, and growing marginalization of judges, who alone
are likely to opt for narrower liability rules rather than broader
ones."114
The most ironic part of the Guidelines' severity-the insult
added to the injury-is that you ostensibly require judges to im-
pose "a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to
comply with the purposes" of sentencing."' Yet because the
Guidelines prohibited many factors,116 and because other factors
were discouraged,", judges were precluded from considering
tice, one would expect that the reduced reliance on probation would be offset by a reduc-
tion in the median prison sentence .. . . On average, however, time served in prison has
increased in the Guidelines era.").
113. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 505, 525-26 (2001). Of course, Jeremy Bentham defended the proposition that "[tihe
legislator ought, as much as possible, to determine everything relating to punishments, for
two reasons: that they may be certain, and impartial." JEREMY BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE
OF PUNISHMENT 411-12 (1830) ("The legislator is necessarily unacquainted with the indi-
viduals who will undergo the punishment he appoints; he cannot, therefore, be governed
by feelings of personal antipathy or regard. He is impartial, or at least, appears to be so. A
Judge, on the contrary, only pronouncing upon a particular case, is exposed to favourable
or unfavourable prejudices, or at least, to the suspicion of such, which almost equally
shake the public confidence."). Yet if Stuntz is correct in suggesting that legislators and
prosecutors are, in order to satisfy public passions, complicit in ensuring that offenders are
found guilty and punished, then requiring sentencing judges look defendants in the eye
when imposing punishment may serve as an essential moral check against the politiciza-
tion of crime. See Stuntz, supra, at 526-28, 540-41. But see J.C. Oleson, The Antigone Di-
lemma: When the Paths of Law and Morality Diverge, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 669, 670 (2007)
(noting that many judges impose morally suspect laws under the rationale that "law is
law").
114. Stuntz, supra note 113, at 510.
115. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). The notion that punishment is an evil, and therefore
should be limited in its application to the quantity necessary to prevent crime, can be
traced to Bentham. See BENTHAM, supra note 113, at 24 ("If the evil of the punishment
exceed the evil of the offence [sic), the punishment will be unprofitable, the legislator will
have produced more suffering than he has prevented. He will have purchased exemption
from one evil at the expense of a greater.").
116. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5H1.4, 5H1.10, 5H1.12 (2009) (not-
ing that race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, socioeconomic status, lack of guidance as
a youth, drug or alcohol dependence, gambling addiction, and economic hardship are pro-
hibited categories).
117. See id. §§ 5H1.2-5H1.6, 5H1.11 (noting that defendant's physical condition or ap-
pearance; family ties and responsibilities; education and vocational skills; employment
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many of the offender characteristics that historically had been re-
levant to sentencing (e.g., addiction, employment, or family obli-
gations). Judges who took the parsimony provision seriously and
tried to sentence below the Guidelines were stymied unless there
existed a "mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commis-
sion in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sen-
tence different from that described.""8 Even then, in deciding
whether a factor had been adequately taken into consideration,
judges were permitted to "consider only the sentencing guide-
lines, policy statements, and official commentary of the Sentenc-
ing Commission.""9 And because the Guidelines have been
amended more than seven hundred times since their promulga-
tion,12 0 there are virtually no sentencing factors that have not
been considered by the Commission. 2'
The result? Frustrated federal judges are directed by statute to
impose the least severe punishment to satisfy the enumerated
goals of punishment while being simultaneously required by the
Guidelines to impose sentences far longer than those imposed in
other jurisdictions. In fact, the draconian nature of federal sen-
tences may explain why Justice Kennedy publicly condemned the
harshness of the Guidelines and praised judges who found ways
to exercise their departure authority. Specifically, Justice Kenne-
dy asserted that federal judges who depart downward from the
Guidelines are "courageous, and [are] exercising the indepen-
dence and the authority of the judiciary not to follow blindly un-
just guidelines.""12
record; military, civic, charitable or public service record; and mental and emotional condi-
tions are not ordinarily relevant).
118. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b).
119. Id. § 3553(b)(1). This provision was added at the Commission's suggestion so that
its members and records could not be subpoenaed into court. See 133 CONG. REC. 31,947
(1987).
120. Commission Press Release, supra note 1.
121. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 2, at 102 ("As it happens, the Sentencing
Commission has already considered, and the Sentencing Guidelines have already factored
in, many if not all circumstances that are arguably relevant to criminal sentencing; this
micro-management is one of the Guidelines' most notable features. The Guidelines have
done this by prohibiting altogether the consideration of some factors and by specifying the
weight to be accorded other significant factors depending on the precise degree to which
they are present.").
122. See Alan J. Chaset, Improving the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Can We Get
There From Here?, CHAMPION, June 2004, at 6, 6.
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It says rather a lot about the severity of the Guidelines that a
sitting Supreme Court Justice has gone on record, praising "cou-
rageous" judges who resist blind obedience to "unjust guidelines."
But, Sara, while severity is one flaw of the Guidelines, it is not
the only one.
2. Complexity
Many despise the Guidelines because of their harshness; others
hate them because of how complex and labyrinthine they are.
Most guidelines systems employ a modest number of offense le-
vels. For example, Minnesota's felony guidelines grid has eleven
levels," Pennsylvania's grid has fourteen, 11 and Washington
State utilizes a sixteen-level grid.125 There are good reasons to
keep sentencing grids simple. For one thing, while it may be poss-
ible to distinguish between ten or fifteen levels of culpability (e.g.,
manslaughter is less serious than second-degree murder, which is
less serious than first-degree murder, and so forth), it can be dif-
ficult to draw meaningful distinctions between overly elaborate
sentencing grades.126 Michael Tonry, for example, has described
sentencing commissions as struggling with the question, "Could
we plausibly explain to a judge why a level sixteen crime is more
serious than a level fifteen crime?"127 Additionally, the more com-
plicated the sentencing grid, the more susceptible it becomes to
error."" Even simple sentencing grids regularly lead to calcula-
tion errors and elaborate grids produce even higher levels of ap-
plication error.2 9
123. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 57 (2008).
124. See PA. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 303.16 (2008).
125. WASH. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 1-2 tbl.1 (2008).
126. See TONRY, supra note 4, at 98-99.
127. Id. at 98.
128. See id. at 87.
129. Id. at 99. Erik Luna describes the same problem: "Mhe sheer complexity of the
system ensures a high error rate in tallying federal sentences. The cases are legion of offi-
cials miscalculating sentence length . . . sometimes resulting in sentences that are off by
years." Luna, supra note 56, at 12. Empirical studies confirm this theory. In 1992, re-
searchers at a sentencing institute asked forty-seven probation officers to calculate base
offense levels for three hypothetical defendants. Pamela B. Lawrence & Paul J. Hofer, An
Empirical Study of the Application of Relevant Conduct Guidelines § 1B1.3, 10 FED.
SENT'G REP. 16, 17 (1997). Officers applying the relevant conduct rules produced widely
divergent outcomes, ranging from 57 to 136 months for the first defendant, 37 to 136
months for the second defendant, and 24 to 136 months for the third defendant. Id. at 18-
19. In a 1996 survey, less than twenty percent of probation officers indicated that Guide-
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But such concerns did not prevent the Commission from intro-
ducing a federal sentencing grid that contains forty-three rows
(offense levels) and six columns (criminal history categories).13o
That's 258 different cells, resulting in a grid so large it has to be
printed in a small font size to fit on a single page.'3 And while
that grid might appear to contain a ridiculous level of detail,132 lo-
cating an offender's placement on the Guidelines table isn't just a
matter of looking up the offense level and the number of prior
convictions. In fact, the grid may be the most straightforward
part of the Guidelines analysis. 33
To ascertain the offense level, one must start with the offense
of conviction, include relevant conduct, add specific offense cha-
racteristics, and factor in cross-references;" in drug cases, weight
calculations are paramount, and in economic crimes, loss
amounts and specific offense characteristics drive sentences. 35
Special mathematical operations are needed to derive adjusted
scores for multiple counts, and adjustments must be made for ob-
struction of justice or acceptance of responsibility.13 6 Similarly, to
lines calculations were accurate in most of the cases they had seen, while forty percent
indicated that they were more likely than not to be incorrect. See Probation Officers Advi-
sory Group Survey, 8 FED. SENT'G REP. 303, 303, 306 (1996) [hereinafter Probation Officers
Survey].
130. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A sentencing tbl. (2009). The complexi-
ty of the grid can be traced to congressional requirements:
If a sentence specified by the guidelines includes a term of imprisonment, the
maximum of the range established for such a term shall not exceed the min-
imum of that range by more than the greater of 25 percent or 6 months, ex-
cept that, if the minimum term of the range is 30 years or more, the maxi-
mum may be life imprisonment.
28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (2006). Even if the Sentencing Commission had not determined to
make the levels overlapping, the statute requires a minimum of eighteen levels. See
CONSTITUTION PROJECT, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FEDERAL CRIMINAL SENTENCING IN A
POST-BOOKER WORLD 22 n.26 (2006), available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/
manage/file/33.pdf (describing mathematical minimum of eighteen levels). The Constitu-
tion Project recommends repeal of the "25% rule" and adoption of a ten-level grid. Id. at
13-14. The Commission has also explored the possibility of simplifying the Guidelines. See
U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, supra note 12 (describing simplification efforts).
131. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A sentencing tbl. (2009).
132. Justice Breyer has been critical of such fine distinctions. "Ranking offenders
through the use of fine distinctions is like ranking colleges or the 'liveableness' of cities
with numerical scores that reach ten places past a decimal point. The precision is false."
Breyer, supra note 104, at 186.
133. See Marc Miller, Rehabilitating the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 78
JUDICATURE 180, 183-84 (1995) (describing the complexity of the Guidelines).
134. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ iBi.1, 111.3 (2009).
135. See id. ch. 2, pts. B, D.
136. See id. ch. 3, pts. D, E.
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determine the criminal history score, one must calculate points
assigned for qualifying previous sentences, adjusting for their re-
cency, departing as necessary, and then ensure that the score is
not otherwise enhanced by any of the criminal history provisions
governing career offenders, armed career criminals, or repeat
child sexual offenders.13
Sara, just finding the appropriate block on the elaborate feder-
al grid can be baffling. For this reason, the instruction manual is
enormous. Indeed, the most recent iterations of the Guidelines
manual (including the Guidelines, policy statements, and com-
mentary) contain more than fifteen hundred pages of technical
regulations."' That means the combined portions of the Guide-
lines manual are thicker than the telephone directories of many
metropolitan cities.'3" Furthermore, the content of those pages can
be numbingly dense.u0 For these reasons it has been said that
"the Guidelines make the federal tax code look like Reader's Di-
gest.""
One of the reasons more than fifteen hundred pages of instruc-
tions are needed is that the federal system incorporates modified
real-offense sentencing.'4 State guideline systems have rejected
real-offense sentencing,143 perhaps because the idea is so non-
intuitive.
137. See id. ch. 4, pts. A, B.
138. See Erik Luna, Gridland: An Allegorical Critique of Federal Sentencing, 96 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 25, 35 (2005) ("The Guidelines supposedly set down a sentence
for every case through exhaustive rules contained in the 'Guidelines Manual,' a document
that has ballooned to some 1,500 pages of regulations . . . .").
139. See Adam Zagorin, Get Out of Jail, Not Quite Free, TIME, May 24, 1993, http://
www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,9 7 8562 ,00.html.
140. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 2, at 3 ('The Sentencing Guidelines are almost
a parody of the overly detailed, inflexible legal structures that lawyer and author Philip K
Howard criticized in his 1994 best-selling book, The Death of Common Sense.").
141. Luna, supra note 56, at 12 (citation omitted). But see Frank 0. Bowman, III, Fear
of Law: Thoughts on Fear of Judging and the State of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 299, 328-29 (2000) (noting that an empirical measurement of the tax
code against the Guidelines reveals that the tax code is much larger).
142. See William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REV. 495, 503-06, 513 (1990) (describing
relevant conduct sentencing).
143. See ToNRY, supra note 4, at 78 ("Real offense sentencing has been unanimously
rejected elsewhere . . . ."); id. at 93-94 ("[T]he sentencing commissions in Arkansas, Cana-
da, Delaware, Kansas, Florida, Louisiana, Minnesota, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wisconsin unanimously rejected real offense sen-
tencing and based guidelines on conviction offenses.").
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When sentencing experts tell laypeople that, in the federal sys-
tem, defendants can be punished for criminal counts that were
never filed-even for crimes of which they were acquitted-and
for facts that are not found beyond a reasonable doubt, the public
often thinks that these legal scholars are having one over on
them.144 It sounds too Kafkaesque to be true.4 5 When the experts
do succeed in convincing the public that they're serious, people
are outraged. Indeed, many scholars and lawyers are outraged;146
others were, and have merely grown inured by habit.1 47 Punishing
defendants for uncharged or acquitted conduct sounds like the
cruelest of lawyer jokes:
A man walks into a lawyer's office and says he's been indicted with
partners on multiple counts of stock fraud. He sees the government's
case as weak and wants to go to trial. The lawyer informs the
stunned client that if he's convicted on only one count, the jury's not-
guilty verdict on the other charges means little under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. Why? A defendant may be punished for ac-
quitted conduct if the judge merely believes he's guilty. The punch
144. See id. at 93-94 ("More than once when describing the relevant conduct system to
government officials and judges outside the United States, I have been accused of misre-
porting or exaggerating.").
145. See FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL 7 (Willa Muir & Edwin Muir trans., Alfred A. Knopf,
Inc. 1992) (1925) ('"That is the Law. How could there be a mistake in that?' 'I don't know
this law,' said K. 'All the worse for you,' replied the warder. . . . 'You'll come up against it
yet."'); see also G. Thomas Eisele, The Sentencing Guidelines System? No. Sentencing
Guidelines? Yes., FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1991, at 16, 20 (characterizing the Guidelines sys-
tem as Kafkaesque).
146. See Elizabeth T. Lear, Is Conviction Irrelevant? 40 UCLA L. REV. 1179, 1237-39
(1993); Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Facts: Travesties of Real-Offense Sentencing, 45 STAN.
L. REV. 523, 553-64 (1993); David Yellen, Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice: Real-Offense Sen-
tencing and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 78 MINN. L. REV. 403, 403, 405 (1993).
147. See generally STEVE BOGIRA, COURTROOM 302: A YEAR BEHIND THE SCENES IN AN
AMERICAN CRIMINAL COURTHOUSE (2005) (describing blas6 attitude of courtroom actors).
Borrowing from G.K. Chesterton, Bogira notes:
"[he horrible thing about all legal officials, even the best, about all judges,
magistrates, barristers, detectives, and policemen, is not that they are wicked
(some of them are good), not that they are stupid (several of them are quite
intelligent), it is simply that they have got used to it. Strictly they do not see
the prisoner in the dock; all they see is the usual man in the usual place.
They do not see the awful court of judgment; they only see their own work-
shop."
Id. at vii (quoting G.K. CHESTERTON, The Twelve Men, in TREMENDOUS TRIFLES 85-86
(1909)). The same point has been made about the Guidelines. See Luna, supra note 138, at
74 ("The mechanical methodology anesthetizes the system, its participants, and even the
public to the inherently moral judgment involved in punishing another human being with
the imprimatur of the state.").
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line: You can win at a trial only if there's a complete acquittal. If
you're convicted of anything, you can be punished for everything.14 8
The idea behind real-offense sentencing was noble enough:
shifting power away from prosecutors (who could charge-bargain)
to judges (who could sentence using all relevant conduct, regard-
less of what prosecutors charged). 49 In theory, real-offense sen-
tencing might have resembled inquisitorial civil-code jurispru-
dence.so But in practice, Sara, the shift in power did not operate
as imagined. Parties subverted the Guidelines to reach acceptable
outcomes.15' Having great leverage, prosecutors-through charge-
and fact-bargaining--controlled Guidelines sentencing far more
than they had during the pre-Guidelines era. 15 2
District judges did not assume power over sentencing under
real-offense guidelines, Sara. Do you know who did? Prosecutors
did.' 3 The Commission did. 54
148. Gerald Shargel, Run-on Sentencing: The Barely Noticed Mayhem Following the
Supreme Court's Blakely Decision, SLATE (July 12, 2004, 5:21 PM), http://www.slate.
com/id/2103754.
149. See Julie R. O'Sullivan, In Defense of the United States Sentencing Guidelines'
Modified Real-Offense System, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1342, 1347 (1997) ("Pure real-offense
sentencing also works to remove the secondary level of potential sentencing disparities by
nullifying the influence of the prosecutor's choice of charge upon the eventual sentencing
decision. Assuming that the sentencing authority has complete access to the 'real' circums-
tances of the offense and is able to resolve accurately disputes regarding those facts, each
defendant will receive a sentence commensurate with offenders sharing the same 'real'
characteristics, not just those with whom the prosecutor, for her own reasons, chooses to
group the defendant.").
150. See Nancy Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence: American Judges and Sen-
tencing, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 523, 533 (2007) ("The premises of the Guidelines trans-
formed common law judges into civil code clerks."). Of course, not all federal judges were
supportive of a civil-code approach to sentencing. See Eisele, supra note 145, at 20 ("I have
characterized this system as a dark, sinister, and cynical crime management program. It
is in effect a reincarnation of those systems prevalent in Central and Eastern European
countries 150 years ago. It has a certain Kafkaesque aura about it.").
151. See Bowman, supra note 141, at 341 (reporting national Guidelines departure in
about a third of cases); Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An
Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 501, 553-54 (1992) (reporting that judges and prosecutors
circumvented guidelines in about one-sixth of cases); Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H.
Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The First Fifteen
Months, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 284-86 (1989) (reporting manipulation of the guide-
lines by prosecutors).
152. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 141, at 341-47 (describing Guidelines evasion via
departures, charge bargaining, and fact bargaining); Probation Officers Survey, supra note
129, at 303 (discussing fact bargaining); Mary Pat Flaherty & Joan Biskupic, Prosecutors
Can Stack the Deck; Sentencing Powers Shift from Judges, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1996, at
Al.
153. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for
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The Commission seized power over sentencing (a power tradi-
tionally reserved for judges) by establishing an elaborate system
that regulated not only the judicial interpretation of charged of-
fenses, but governed every relevant aspect of sentencing. It tried
to quantify every aspect of the offense and the offender like some
kind of weird Dungeon Master's Guide' of punishment-
elaborate rules rooted in look-up tables. But federal defendants
are not eleventh-level paladins, and commentators have con-
demned the Commission for pretending that three-dimensional
actors can be adequately represented on the two-dimensional
world of the sentencing grid.
Inspired by the classic novella of mathematics, Flatland,5 6 Erik
Luna writes:
Voila! A human being has been transformed from a multidimension-
al being into a string of letters and numbers, cast onto the grid of
Gridland for internment in a federal penitentiary. The defendant is
now a two-dimensional character-as flat as any in Flatland-his
vertical axis an offense level and his horizontal axis a criminal histo-
ry category. There is no depth or detail, no shading or perspective,
only an initial movement within the grid pursuant to points or levels
duly added or subtracted, placing him within a narrow range of pu-
nishment. The Guidelines are "neutral" with regard to the offender's
race, sex, national origin, and creed, a restriction that seems emi-
nently reasonable in both Gridland and worlds of higher dimensio-
nality. But federal judges cannot consider an assortment of issues
deemed significant in lands not wholly defined by the x-y axes, in-
cluding the defendant's: age, education, vocational skills, mental and
emotional condition, physical condition, drug or alcohol dependence,
lack of guidance as a youth, employment history, family ties and re-
sponsibilities, community ties, military and public service, and char-
Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 926 (1991) (describing the Guidelines system as
a "prosecutor's paradise"); Stith, supra note 98, at 1430 ("[Tlhere is no doubt that because
they set forth the consequences of each statutory charge and each specified sentencing fac-
tor, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines had the potential to effect a transfer of discretion
over the severity of punishment from the judge to the prosecutor.").
154. See Stith, supra note 98, at 1435 ("In this way, a sentence would be based on the
rules set forth by the Commission, not on the exercise of discretion by either the judge or
the prosecutor.").
155. E. GARY GYGAX & DAVE ARNESON, DUNGEON MASTER'S GUIDE (Kim Mohan et al.
eds., Wizards of the Coast, Inc., rev. 3.5 2003) (1979) (providing documentation and refer-
ence tables that allow the Dungeon Master to facilitate play of Dungeons and Dragons).
156. See William F. Lindgren & Thomas F. Banchoof, Introduction to EDWIN A.
ABBOTT, FLATLAND 1 (William F. Lindgren & Thomas F. Banchoof eds., Cambridge Univ.
Press 2010) (1884).
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itable works. Under the Guidelines, judges thus confront defendants
as numbers rather than as human beings.'
Luna makes an important point here, Sara. Important enough
that another example is warranted. In the film Dead Poets Socie-
ty, a classroom of prep students is confronted with a stultifying
essay (by Dr. J. Evans Pritchard, Ph.D.) entitled "Understanding
Poetry."sa It directs students of poetry to ask two questions:
One, how artfully has the objective of the poem been rendered, and
two, how important is that objective. Question one rates the poem's
perfection, question two rates its importance.... If the poem's score
for perfection is plotted along the horizontal of a graph, and its im-
portance is plotted on the vertical, then calculating the total area of
the poem yields the measure of its greatness. A sonnet by Byron may
score high on the vertical, but only average on the horizontal. A
Shakespearean sonnet, on the other hand, would score high both ho-
rizontally and vertically, yielding a massive total area, thereby re-
vealing the poem to be truly great."'
The X and Y axis might seem strangely familiar to you, Sara.
In the movie, after one of the students reads the essay aloud, the
new English teacher, John Keating, pronounces his judgment of
it: "Excrement. That's what I think of Mr. J. Evans Pritchard.
We're not laying pipe, we're talking about poetry."160 Keating tells
his students to tear out the page-to tear out the entire essay-
assuring them, "It's not the Bible, you're not going to go to hell for
this. Go on, make a clean tear, I want nothing left of it."161
Keating, too, makes an important point. Merely draping some-
thing-be it poetry or sentencing-in the trappings of mathemat-
ics and science does not make it empirical. For example, the ma-
thematics of the Guidelines may help to conceal the Commission's
failure to make fundamental decisions about sentencing philoso-
phies,162 but merely quantifying variables does not mean an ap-
proach is scientific or accurate. 63 Yes, the jargon of the Guidelines
157. Luna, supra note 138, at 38-39 (2005).
158. DEAD POETS SOCIETY (Touchstore Pictures 1989). The essay is exceedingly similar
to the real-life work of Laurence Perrine. See LAURENCE PERRINE, SOUND AND SENSE: AN
INTRODUCTION TO POETRY 260-62 (4th ed. 1973).
159. DEAD POETS SOCIETY, supra note 158.
160. Id. (emphasis added).
161. Id.
162. See Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 19, at 29-32 (describing Commission's failure
to identify an organizing theory of punishment).
163. See DARRELL HUFF, How To LIE WITH STATISTICS 8 (1954) ('"The secret language of
statistics, so appealing in a fact-minded culture, is employed to sensationalize, inflate, con-
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(e.g., "points" and "levels" and "scores") creates an appearance of
objectivity and analytic precision,164 but the Guidelines were not
derived entirely by science. In large part, they were established in
the belief that they embodied the punishments Congress
wanted.165 The Commission issued diktats to the courts, dressing
up the politics in the robes of science. They did not explain their
reasoning.
The malcontents who would challenge the Commission's deci-
sions are often frustrated since the Sentencing Commission has a
monopoly on federal sentencing data. 66 Unless an individual is
able to disentangle the Commission's statistics,167 there is no di-
rect way to challenge the policy decisions of the Commission on
empirical grounds.118 Those who wanted to sentence outside the
fuse, and oversimplify.").
164. See United States v. Reich, 661 F. Supp. 371, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("The formulae
and the grid distance the offender from the sentencer-and from the reasons for punish-
ment-by lending the process a false aura of scientific certainty."); Breyer, supra note 104,
at 184-85 (asserting that the Guidelines are not as precise as they may seem).
165. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (describing amendments based on per-
ceived congressional signals).
166. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(w)(1) (2006) (requiring the chief judge of each district to sub-
mit to the Sentencing Commission a written report on each sentence imposed that in-
cludes the judgment and commitment order, the statement of reasons, any plea agree-
ment, the indictment or other charging document, and the presentence report). Because
many of these documents are not public record, there is no meaningful way to examine
patterns of federal sentencing, independent of the Sentencing Commission's dataset. Some
have argued for increased transparency in sentencing data. See Marc L. Miller, A Map of
Sentencing and a Compass for Judges: Sentencing Information Systems, Transparency,
and the Next Generation of Reform, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1351, 1356-57 (2005) (arguing for
increased public access to sentencing data); Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller,
Reviewing the Sentencing Guidelines: Judicial Politics, Empirical Evidence, and Reform,
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 715, 740-41 (2008) ("The unavailability of judge-identifying data in
criminal sentencing is one of the most frustrating aspects of the study of federal sentenc-
ing and has significantly impeded scholarly evaluation of the Guidelines' efficacy.").
167. See Cindy R. Alexander et al., Evaluating Trends in Corporate Sentencing: How
Reliable Are the United States Sentencing Commission's Data?, 13 FED. SENT'G REP. 108,
108 (2000) (suggesting that the quality and usefulness of the Sentencing Commission's
corporate sentencing data is limited).
168. But see Amy Baron-Evans, Sentencing by the Statute 21 (Office of Defender Ser-
vices, Working Paper, Apr. 27, 2009), http://www.fd.org/pdf lib/Sentencing%2OBy%20the
%20Statute.2.28.09.pdf. ("[Riarely do the guidelines reflect the Commission's study of pre-
guideline sentencing practice, nor do most guidelines reflect the Commission's exercise of
judgment as an expert, research-based agency unfettered by politics. Using empirical re-
search, in some cases research undertaken at the Commission itself, you can readily show
that the guideline range was not developed based on national sentencing data or empirical
research and that it recommends a sentence that is greater than necessary to satisfy §
3553(a)'s objectives.... In fact, you can develop an evidentiary basis for a non-guidelines
sentence that is stronger than anything the Commission has developed in support of the
recommended guideline range.").
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Guidelines could not disaggregate the data to support their ef-
forts; judges who didn't want to be reversed on appeal had no
choice but to submit. 169
In some ways, the Commission's use of opacity and mystifica-
tion is reminiscent of the Grand Inquisitor in Dostoevsky's mag-
num opus, The Brothers Karamazov.170 The Guidelines may have
reduced unwarranted disparity," and perhaps they even pre-
vented Congress from enacting more mandatory minimum sta-
tutes;172 but they did so at great cost, trenching upon the discre-
tion of judges, limiting their ability to tailor sentences to fit the
specific characteristics of the offense and the offender. In the fol-
lowing quote, Dostoevsky's Inquisitor is describing the authority
of the church, but the same principle may apply to the Commis-
sion:
169. By supplanting the old (decentralized) approach to sentencing, the Guidelines
have made it virtually impossible to think about federal sentencing without referencing
them. See United States v. Jaber, 362 F. Supp. 2d 365, 375-76 (D. Mass. 2005) ("[The
Guidelines] have shaped the vocabulary we use to describe sentences, and the standards
we use to evaluate and compare cases. Since there were no alternative rules prior to the
Sentencing Guidelines-no empirical studies linking particular sentences to particular
crime control objectives, no common law of sentencing-and there have been none since,
the Guidelines will continue to have a critical impact."). Actually, the habituation of
judges to the Guidelines is not so different from the operant conditioning of sheep:
"We solved our problem [of managing the location of sheep] with a portable
electric fence which could be used to move our flock of sheep about the lawn
like a gigantic mowing machine, but leaving most of it free at any time. At
night the sheep are taken across the brook to the main fold. But we soon
found that the sheep kept to the enclosure and quite clear of the fence, which
didn't need to be electrified. So we substituted a piece of string, which is easi-
er to move around.... [New lambs stray,] but they cause no trouble and soon
learn to keep with the flock. The curious thing is ... that most of these sheep
have never been shocked by the fence. Most of them were born after we took
the wire away. It has become a tradition among our sheep never to approach
string. The lambs acquire it from their elders, whose judgment they never
question."
B.F. SKINNER, WALDEN Two 15-16 (Hackett Publ'g Co. 2005) (1948).
170. FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV 249-50 (Richard Pevear & La-
rissa Volokhonsky trans. 1990) (1880).
171. See FIFTEEN YEARS REPORT, supra note 3, at 140 (concluding that Guidelines have
reduced inter-judge disparity).
172. But see Barkow, supra note 55, at 770-71 ("Of course, it is possible that without
the Sentencing Commission, Congress would have enacted even longer sentences or
passed even more mandatory minimums. But ... [i]n those instances where the Commis-
sion tried to exert influence and get Congress to change course, it failed. And in many oth-
er instances where Congress took action on sentencing, there is no evidence that the
Commission was consulted. If the Commission has had a moderating influence, it has been
so slight as to be imperceptible.").
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With us everyone will be happy, and they will no longer rebel or de-
stroy each other, as in your freedom, everywhere. Oh, we shall con-
vince them that they will only become free when they resign their
freedom to us, and submit to us. Will we be right, do you think, or
will we be lying? They themselves will be convinced that we are
right, for they will remember to what horrors of slavery and confu-
sion your freedom led them. Freedom, free reason, and science will
lead them into such a maze, and confront them with such miracles
and insoluble mysteries, that some of them, unruly and ferocious,
will exterminate themselves; others, unruly but feeble, will extermi-
nate each other; and the remaining third, feeble and wretched, will
crawl to our feet and cry out to us: "Yes, you were right, you alone
possess his mystery, and we are coming back to you-save us from
ourselves."" 3
Sara, whether the complexity of the Guidelines was intentional
and benevolent (pacifying judges and saving them from Con-
gress), intentional and self-serving, or purely accidental, their
complexity may have increased their acceptance. By masking the
politics of sentencing beneath a veneer of science, the Guidelines
made punishment appear more rational, empirical, and precise.
But the complexity of the Guidelines simultaneously made them
cumbersome and subject to increased rates of error. Furthermore,
the complexity (and severity) of the Guidelines were greatly ex-
acerbated by a third problem: rigidity.
3. Rigidity
Until the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker,
the Guidelines were binding.74 In practice, the Guidelines were
law;7 5 only nominally were they ever "guidelines." Of course,
"mandatory guidelines" is both a contradiction in terms and more
than a little Orwellian,16 but that's the nomenclature that was
used. And, as you know very well, a great deal of friction was
generated in the world of federal sentencing over just how man-
datory those guidelines were.
173. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 170, at 258.
174. 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
175. See Stith, supra note 98, at 1429-30 ("As Justice Antonin Scalia recognized in his
1989 dissent in Mistretta[,] . . . and as Justice Harry Blackmun's majority opinion refused
to acknowledge, the Guidelines were law.").
176. See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 5 (1949) (coining such memorable slogans as "WAR
IS PEACE," "FREEDOM IS SLAVERY," and "IGNORANCE IS STRENGTH").
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This was strange. One might think that if judges kept depart-
ing from a guideline system, it might suggest that those guide-
lines were in need of revision. After all, that was the idea when
you were born, Sara.'7 But that is not what transpired. Instead of
locating the problem with the Guidelines, the problem was
blamed on activist judges."17 Accordingly, the solution was not to
modify the Guidelines, but to coerce judges into compliance. At
one point, House Majority Whip Tom DeLay threatened, "'The
judges need to be intimidated.... They need to uphold the Con-
stitution.' If they don't behave, 'we're going to go after them in a
big way."' And in what sometimes seemed like a battle between
branches of government,' some legislators threatened to strip
judges of all discretion, enacting broad slates of mandatory mi-
nimums."'s Sometimes the conflict seemed less like a battle, and
more like a knife fight. At one point, Judge James Rosenbaum
was investigated by the House Judiciary Committee for resisting
the Guidelines.182
177. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) (2006) ("The Commission periodically shall review and re-
vise, in consideration of comments and data coming to its attention, the guidelines prom-
ulgated pursuant to the provisions of this section."); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,
DOWNWARD DEPARTURES FROM THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 5 (2003) [hereinaf-
ter DOWNWARD DEPARTURES], available at http://www.ussc.gov/departrpt03/departrpt03.
pdf (noting that "a high or increasing rate of departures for a particular offense, for exam-
ple, might indicate that the guideline for that offense does not take into account adequate-
ly a particular recurring circumstance and should be amended accordingly").
178. See, e.g., David M. Zlotnick, The War Within the War on Crime: The Congressional
Assault on Judicial Sentencing Discretion, 57 SMU L. REV. 211 passim (2004) (describing
congressional hostility toward federal judges who exercised judicial discretion).
179. Joan Biskupic, Hill Republicans Target 'Judicial Activism, Conservatives Block
Nominees, Threaten Impeachment and Term Limits, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1997, at Al.
180. See, e.g., Debra Rosenberg et al., The War on Judges, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 25, 2005,
at 22 (describing inflammatory legislative criticism of the judiciary); Ruth Marcus, Booting
the Bench; There's New Ferocity in Talk of Firing Activitist Judges, WASH. POST, Apr. 11,
2005, at A19 (describing intense congressional interest in impeaching "activist" federal
judges and justices).
181. See Blakely v. Washington and the Future of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 3 (2004) [hereinafter Blakely
Hearing] (comments of Sen. Hatch) ("[I]t is possible that some here in Congress may re-
spond by creating new mandatory minimum penalties to compensate for this unfettered
discretion.").
182. See Zlotnick, supra note 178, at 227-28 (describing House Judiciary Committee's
investigation of Judge Rosenbaum's records); Tresa Baldas, Congress Comes After a Fed-
eral Judge: Sentencing at Issue in Subpoena Uproar, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 24, 2003, at Al ("In
a rare and controversial move that has judges nationwide expressing concern, the House
Judiciary Committee has threatened to issue subpoenas for records relating to Rosen-
baum's sentencing decisions, and has requested a federal review of the entire Minnesota
federal bench as part of a broader inquiry .... ); David Rubenstein, Rosenbaum Inquisi-
tion, NATION, Dec. 11, 2003, at 7 (describing investigation of Judge Rosenbaum's sentenc-
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This battle over departures largely ignored the fact that dis-
trict judges are not the only actors exercising discretion in the
system. Prosecutors were free to grant downward departures for
substantial assistance, 1 3 and no one in Congress seemed particu-
larly bothered by that. United States Attorney's offices were free
to establish different practices (e.g., one district would establish a
fast-track program while an adjacent district would not, resulting
in radically different sentences for offenders separated by only a
few miles),'8 1 and no one in Congress seemed bothered by that, ei-
ther. Sentencing disparity of this kind was deemed to be war-
ranted disparity.ss But as soon as a judge departed downward
from a Guidelines sentence because the Justice Department's
fast-track system did not operate in the district, he would be re-
versed, even if the departure had been applied to redress sentenc-
ing disparity created by the unequal promulgation of fast-track
programs.'86 The inference is obvious: under the mandatory
Guidelines, prosecutorial discretion was viewed as a necessary
evil but all judicial discretion was suspect."'7
Of course, the Orwellian "mandatory Guidelines" were struck
down as constitutionally doubleungood in United States v. Book-
er.'5 But, curiously, even post-Booker, there has been a great deal
of attention paid to rates of departure and variances. Judges wor-
ing practices).
183. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2009).
184. See Steven G. Kalar & Jon Sands, An Object All Sublime-Let the Punishment Fit
the Crime: Federal Sentencing after Gall and Kimbrough, 32 CHAMPION, Mar. 2008, at 20,
28 ("Over the past decade, different federal districts have created-or rejected-'fast track'
offers for illegal re-entry defendants. These (non-guideline) deals can mean a 75 percent
reduction in a federal defendant's sentence. Whether an alien gets these deals depends
largely on the geographical fluke of location of arrest. Whether an alien is detected on the
border in Arizona instead of Nevada, or even between divisions in the same district in
Texas, can mean that a defendant will--or will not-receive these remarkable deals. The
discrepancies between identically situated aliens who do-or do not-receive fast-track
deals make a mockery of the guidelines' goal to eliminate sentencing disparity.").
185. See Marc L. Miller, Purposes at Sentencing, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 413, 423-25 (1992)
(discussing what constitutes unwarranted disparity).
186. See, e.g., United States v. Banuelos-Rodriguez, 215 F.3d 969, 970-73, 978 (9th Cir.
2000) (rejecting § 3553 sentence below Guidelines based on fast track disparities). But see,
e.g., United States v. Morales-Chaires, 430 F.3d 1124, 1131 (9th Cir. 2005) (upholding a §
3553 sentence above Guidelines, despite fast-track disparity).
187. See, e.g., 130 CONG. REC. 973 (1984). Senator Mathias characterized the views of
SRA supporters: "[J]udges cannot be trusted. You cannot trust a judge ... you must not
trust a judge." Id.
188. 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
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ried that if they took a "free at last, free at last" approach,s9 Con-
gress might respond with a "Booker fix" even more restrictive
than the mandatory Guidelines.19o So judges monitored sentenc-
ing trends closely, as did the Commission and a vigilant Con-
gress.19' Even now, the Commission presents its data by compar-
ing post-Booker statistics against pre-Booker rates of
departures,192 even though pre-Booker Guidelines achieved their
compliance rates by violating the Sixth Amendment. 3
The rigidity of the Guidelines can be traced to a zeal for parity.
Parity in sentencing lies close to your heart, Sara;", and equal
punishment for equal offenders is a difficult proposition with
which to quibble. Of course, wherever there is discretion, there is
disparity, so the Guidelines imposed dramatic limits on judicial
discretion.195 Yet in so doing, the Guidelines deprived judges of
the ability to tailor appropriate sentences to the characteristics of
each offender and each offense. 9 Yes, the Guidelines succeeded
in treating like offenders alike, but they did so by (to a large de-
gree) treating unlike offenders alike.97
Parity in sentencing is an important goal in any just system of
laws, but it is not the only goal.98 After all, automatic death pe-
189. See United States v. Jaber, 362 F. Supp. 2d 365, 370 (D. Mass. 2005) (describing
the "free at last" approach as an unacceptable response to Booker).
190. See United States v. Wilson, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1287-88 (D. Utah 2005)
("Should the courts fail to carry out congressional will, there should be little doubt what
will follow. Congress can easily implement its desired level of punitiveness in the criminal
justice system, through such blunderbuss devices as mandatory minimum sentences."); see
also supra note 181 (describing suggestion of mandatory minimums).
191. See DOWNWARD DEPARTURES, supra note 177, at 1 (analyzing departure data as
required by § 401(m) of the PROTECT Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650, 675
(codified at 28 U.S.C. 994 note (2006))).
192. See, e.g., PRELIMINARY QUARTERLY DATA REPORT, 10 fig. A (Third Quarter 2010),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data-andStatistics/Federal Sentencing-Statistics(Quar
terSentencingUpdatesUSSC_2010_Quarter_- Report_- 3rd.pdf.
193. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed. . . .").
194. See FIFTEEN YEARS REPORT, supra note 3, at 79 (identifying disparity reduction as
main objective of SRA); Feinberg, supra note 13, at 295 (same).
195. See Patti B. Saris, Below the Radar Screens: Have the Sentencing Guidelines Elim-
inated Disparity? One Judge's Perspective, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1027, 1028-29 (1997).
196. Id.
197. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process: The
Problem Is Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 833, 870 (1992).
198. See Alschuler, supra note 153, at 902 ("Some things are worse than sentencing
disparity, and we have found them.").
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nalty statutes would have neatly solved the conundrum of chan-
neled discretion in post-Furman capital punishment cases-
assuring oodles of parity-but in Woodson v. North Carolina, sta-
tutes of this kind were struck down as unconstitutional.19 The
federal courts place great value on equal justice under law,200 but
our idea of justice encompasses other values, too, such as afford-
ing defendants competent representation, 201 requiring each ele-
ment of a crime to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt before
finding someone guilty,22 or entitling defendants to a jury of their
peers. 203 These values may frustrate efforts to establish parity,
but they possess a jurisprudential gravity of their own.
Still, the congressional commitment to parity in sentencing,
coupled with a fundamental mistrust of federal judges, led to the
rigidity of the Guidelines (as well as to mandatory minimum sen-
tences). The Guidelines are often praised as being more nuanced
than mandatory minimum sentencing204-operating as a scalpel
instead of a meat cleaver-but the Guidelines were so rigid that,
when they were binding, they operated like "mandatory mini-
mums light." They were more finely calibrated, of course, but they
suffered from the same fundamental inflexibility as statutory mi-
nimums.2 05 Ultimately, ironically, it was the very rigidity of the
199. 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (construing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40
(1971)).
200. Indeed, the words "Equal Justice Under Law," are carved into the architrave of
the Supreme Court of the United States, over the front doors. See OFFICE OF THE
CURATOR, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, THE WEST PEDIMENT: INFORMATION
SHEET (2003), available at http:://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/westpediment.pdf (de-
scribing pediment carvings).
201. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment requires states to provide counsel for indigent defendants).
202. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (holding that when a juvenile is
charged with an offense, every element must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt); Ap-
prendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000) (construing this rule for all offenses).
203. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *344 ("[Hlowever convenient these
(new methods of trial] may appear at first, (as doubtless all arbitrary powers, well ex-
ecuted, are the most convenient) yet let it be again remembered, that delays, and little in-
conveniences in the forms of justice, are the price that all free nations must pay for their
liberty in more substantial matters.").
204. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 104, at 184-85.
205. See, e.g., STITH & CABRANES, supra note 2, at 123 ("[T]he federal Sentencing
Guidelines are not an alternative to mandatory sentencing, as the Commission and many
sentencing reformers insist, but a particularly complex form of mandatory sentencing.");
Freed, supra note 51, at 1742-43 ("Readers of the [Commission's Mandatory Minimums]
report cannot avoid observing the resemblance between the statutory mandates the Com-
mission condemned and the guideline mandates its own Guidelines Manual contained.");
Luna, supra note 56, at 2 ("Like mandatory minimums, the Sentencing Guidelines set
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Guidelines that precipitated the Supreme Court's remedial hold-
ing in United States v. Booker and ushered in a new era of federal
sentencing.20 6
B. That Which Cannot Bend Must Break: Booker and Its Progeny
Shortly after you were conceived on the Senate floor and signed
into existence, the Supreme Court began issuing a series of im-
portant opinions about federal sentencing.
In the beginning, of course, there was Mistretta.
In Mistretta v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Commission and the Guidelines.207 In an
eight-to-one decision (with Justice Scalia writing as the lone dis-
senter), the Court concluded that Congress had not violated the
nondelegation doctrine when it delegated the power to promul-
gate sentencing guidelines for federal offenses to the Commis-
sion. 208 The majority reasoned that "[a]lthough the unique compo-
sition and responsibilities of the Sentencing Commission give rise
to serious concerns about a disruption of the appropriate balance
of governmental power among the coordinate Branches," the
Commission did not violate the principle of separation of pow-
ers.20 9 Neither the location of the Commission within the judicial
branch, 210 nor the requirement that at least three Article III
judges serve,211 nor the fact that the President appoints the com-
missioners,212 was sufficient to invalidate you, Sara.
After Mistretta settled the question of the Commission's consti-
tutionality, the Supreme Court and Congress entered a period of
detente during which tension grew over downward departures.213
Judges who chafed at the severity and rigidity of the Guidelines
strict parameters for punishment (including a lower limit), absent some basis to depart
from the sentencing range.").
206. 543 U.S. 220, 233-34, 245 (2005).
207. 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989). Prior to Mistretta, hundreds of district judges had inva-
lidated the SRA and the Guidelines. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (describing
pre-Mistretta cases).
208. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371.
209. Id. at 384.
210. See id. at 396-97.
211. See id. at 405, 408.
212. Id. at 409.
213. See Zlotnick, supra note 178, at 244 (describing friction between federal judges
and legislators).
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sought mechanisms to impose less draconian sentences, but at
the same time, members of Congress who campaigned on tough
sentences sought mechanisms to block the downward departures
of bleeding-heart judges.2 14
On the one hand, the Guidelines had the force and effect of law,
which suggested that sentences should fall within appropriate
Guidelines ranges (set by the Commission); but on the other
hand, the departure mechanism was part of the Guidelines sys-
tem, which suggested that Congress and the Commission in-
tended judges to have the ability to sentence outside the Guide-
lines whenever the interests of justice so required.2 15 The real
question turned upon how rare departures from the Guidelines
range should be, and whether trial judges or appellate judges
should determine whether the facts of a case warranted a depar-
ture.
Congress and the courts struggled over downward departures,
locked in some weird kind of jurisprudential chess match.216 The
environment between Congress and the judiciary grew strained,
even poisonous. 2 17 Then, in Koon v. United States, the Supreme
Court unanimously held that whether a given sentencing factor
was a legitimate ground for departure was a factual matter to be
determined by the sentencing judge, subject to an abuse of discre-
214. Id. at 226-27.
215. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MVANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(4)(b) (2009) ("When a court
finds an atypical case, one to which a particular guideline linguistically applies but where
conduct significantly differs from the norm, the court may consider whether a departure is
warranted."). This view was articulated in the legislative history of the SRA, as well:
The Committee does not intend that the guidelines be imposed in a mecha-
nistic fashion. It believes that the sentencing judge has an obligation to con-
sider all the relevant factors in a case and to impose a sentence outside the
guidelines in an appropriate case. The purpose of sentencing guidelines is to
provide a structure for evaluating the fairness and appropriateness of the
sentence for an individual offender, not to eliminate the thoughtful imposi-
tion of individualized sentences.
S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 52 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3235.
216. See Kalar & Sands, supra note 184, at 20 (describing Apprendi litigation and shift-
ing coalitions on the Supreme Court as a chess match).
217. See Interview with Stephen B. Burbank, Professor, Univ. of Pa. Sch. of Law, in A
Law Professor's Watch on Judicial Accountability and Independence, THIRD BRANCH, July
2004, at 10 (Burbank stated, "This is the most poisonous atmosphere for legislative-
judicial relations that I can remember.").
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tion standard on appellate review.',' The holding was viewed by
some as encouraging judges to disregard the Guidelines.2 19
The rate of non-prosecution-sponsored downward departures
increased throughout the nineties. It rose from 5.8% in 1991,
spiking to 10.3% in 1996, the year that Koon was decided, and
climbed to 18.1% in 2001.220 Armed with these statistics, an al-
ready-hostile Congress, abetted by the Department of Justice,2 21
enacted a piece of anti-downward-departure legislation known as
the Feeney Amendment. 22
You remember the Feeney Amendment, Sara.
Added as an amendment to the PROTECT Act with virtually
no debate,223 and over the strenuous objections of the judiciary,2 4
the Feeney Amendment was a slap in the face of federal judges.
The legislation contained a host of provisions to hamstring any
judge who might be inclined to sentence below the Guidelines.
Among other things, the amendment overturned Koon and re-
placed the "abuse of discretion" standard with de novo appellate
218. 518 U.S. 81, 96-100 (1996).
219. See Michael S. Gerber, Down with Discretion, LEGAL AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 72,
72 ("Prosecutors who don't like the increase [in downward departures] blame it on activist
judges emboldened by the 1996 Supreme Court decision United States v. Koon.").
220. See DOWNWARD DEPARTURES, supra note 177, at 32 fig. 1 (showing non-cooperation
downward departures).
221. See Skye Phillips, Protect Downward Departures: Congress and the Executive's In-
trusion Into Judicial Independence, 12 J.L. & POL'Y 947, 976-84 (2004) (discussing the in-
terplay between Congress and the Department of Justice in events culminating in the pas-
sage of the Feeney Amendment); Laurie P. Cohen & Gary Fields, Ashcroft Intensifies
Campaign against Soft Sentences by Judges, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2003, at Al ("Mr. Feeney
himself says he was simply the 'messenger' of the amendment bearing his name, which
was drafted by two Justice Department officials.").
222. The Feeney Amendment was a section of the PROTECT Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-21, § 401, 117 Stat. 650, 667 (2003) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 994 note
(2006)). See also supra notes 178-81 and accompanying text (describing congressional hos-
tility toward judicial discretion in sentencing).
223. See 149 CONG. REC. 9365 (Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy)
("This legislation overturns a unanimous Supreme Court decision, without a single day,
hour, or minute of hearings."); SUE MYRICK, PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R.
1104, THE CHILD ABDUCTION PREVENTION ACT OF 2003, H.R. REP. No. 108-48, at 3-4
(2003) (limiting debate on the amendment to a total of 20 minutes, including statements
from proponents).
224. See Letter from William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S.,
to Patrick Leahy, Senator, in 149 CONG. REC. 9351 (Apr. 10, 2003) ("[T]he Judicial Confe-
rence believes that this legislation, if enacted, would do serious harm to the basic struc-
ture of the sentencing guideline system and would seriously impair the ability of courts to
impose just and responsible sentences. Before such legislation is enacted there should, at
least, be a thorough and dispassionate inquiry into the consequences of such action.").
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review.2 25 It prohibited judges from departing downward in almost
all cases involving child pornography, sexual abuse, or sex traf-
ficking;226 prohibited the Commission from establishing any new
grounds for downward departures for two years;2 27 and directed
the Commission to reduce the number of available downward de-
partures. 228 The amendment also required a government motion
before judges could adjust downward for acceptance of responsi-
bility229 or "fast-track" reasons in immigration cases.23 1
More ominously, the Feeney Amendment authorized a "black
list" of judges, requiring the Department of Justice to report all
departures, including the name of the sentencing judge, to Con-
gress within fifteen days of sentencing. 231 This angered and inti-
midated judges232 and, remarkably, prompted Chief Justice Rehn-
quist to warn Congress against overstepping its boundaries.
Almost certainly alluding to the investigation of Judge James Ro-
senbaum233 Chief Justice Rehnquist reminded Congress that
judges cannot be impeached for their official acts:
This [collecting judge-specific information], it seems to me, is more
troubling. For side-by-side with the broad authority of Congress to
legislate and gather information in this area is the principle that
federal judges may not be removed from office for their judicial
acts. ... [This] principle was established just about two centuries
ago in the trial of Justice Samuel Chase of the Superior Court by the
Senate. . . . The political precedent set by Chase's acquittal has go-
verned that day to this: a judge's judicial acts may not serve as a ba-
sis for impeachment.234
225. § 401(d)(2), 117 Stat. at 670 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)).
226. Id. § 401(b) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 994 note).
227. Id. § 401(j)(2).
228. Id. § 401(m)(2)(A).
229. Id. § 401(a)(2) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(2)(A)(iii)).
230. Id. § 401(m)(2)(B) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 994 note).
231. Id. § 401(1)(2)(A) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3553 note).
232. See Zlotnick, supra note 178, at 234 ("This reporting system accomplishes its goal:
the Court is intimidated, and the Court is scared to depart." (quoting Judge Paul Magnu-
son as describing his reasoning for not departing in a white collar crime case)); Ian Urbi-
na, New York's Federal Judges Protest Sentencing Procedures, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2003, at
Bi.
233. See supra note 182 and accompanying text (describing House Judiciary Commit-
tee's investigation of Judge Rosenbaum); see also Representative F. James Sensenbrenner,
Jr., Chairman, House Comm. on the Judiciary, Remarks Before the U.S Judicial Confe-
rence Regarding Congressional Oversight Responsibility of the Judiciary (Mar. 16, 2004),
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/legacy/news031604.htm (implying the seeking of
impeachment for judges who impose "illegal" sentences).
234. William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., Remarks at the
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Finally, the Feeney Amendment reached all the way back to
Mistretta to poke the federal courts in the eye. 235 The amendment
included a provision reducing the number of judges serving on the
Commission from "[at] least three" to "[n]ot more than 3."236
President Bush signed the PROTECT Act-with the Feeney
Amendment's provisions included-into law on April 30, 2003.237
By enacting the Feeney Amendment, Congress, impatient with
federal judges who treated the mandatory Guidelines as if they
were merely advisory, had finally backed downwardly departing
judges into a corner.
But nobody puts Baby in a corner.23
Whether they knew it or not, Congress and the judiciary had
been playing a game of constitutional Jenga.23 9 And with the 2003
passage of the PROTECT Act, the whole assembly came crashing
down.
In United States v. Detwiler, one judge focused on the provision
reducing the number of judges on the Commission. 2 40 Harkening
back to the Supreme Court's analysis in Mistretta, Judge Owen
Panner concluded that post-PROTECT Guidelines were unconsti-
tutional:
The Feeney Amendment also prohibits judges from ever occupying
more than three seats on the Commission, thus ensuring that judges
will never again comprise a majority of the voting membership of the
Commission. When selecting Commission members, the President
Federal Judges Association Board of Directors Meeting (May 5, 2003), available at http://
www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/viewspeeches.aspx?Filename=sp_05-05-03.ht
ml.
235. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (upholding the constitu-
tionality of the SRA, the Commission, and the Guidelines).
236. § 401(n), 117 Stat. at 676 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 991(a)).
237. Id. at 650.
238. DIRTY DANCING (Vestron Pictures 1987).
239. See Steven L. Chanenson, Hoist with Their Own Petard?, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 20,
20 (2004) ('[B]y passing the PROTECT Act .... Congress and the Department [of Justice]
may well have inadvertently helped to destroy the very system they were trying to domi-
nate."); Noelle Tsigounis Valentine, An Exploration of the Feeney Amendment: The Legisla-
tion that Prompted the Supreme Court to Undo Twenty Years of Sentencing Reform, 55
SYRACUSE L. REV. 619, 647-51 (2005) (suggesting Feeney led to Blakely); see also 108
CONG. REC. S8573 (daily ed. July 21, 2004) ("Congress has seriously undermined the basic
structure and fairness of the Federal Guidelines system through posturing and ideology.
... It may be that the Blakely decision was occasioned in part by recent tinkering with the
Sentencing Reform Act that went too far." (quoting Sen. Patrick Leahy)).
240. 338 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1173 (D. Or. 2004).
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need not consider the views of the Judicial Conference unless he vol-
untarily chooses to nominate federal judges.
We are thus left with a strange creature that is nominally lodged
within the Judicial Branch, and purports to be performing duties of a
judicial nature, yet need contain no judges, does not answer to any-
one in the Judicial Branch, and into which the Judicial Branch is as-
sured no input, whether substantively or in selecting the members of
the Commission.14 '
Judge Panner's opinion was hailed as a "separation of powers
masterpiece that should be included in most con law casebooks "242
but was disavowed as controlling law in the District of Oregon.243
And although intellectually provocative, the Detwiler analysis
was never explored in the courts of appeals, because the Supreme
Court's decisions in Blakely v. Washington and United States v.
Booker effectively mooted its holding.244
Both Blakely and Booker were blockbusters.
In Blakely, the Court applied the principle from Apprendi v.
New Jersey that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt."2 45 The Court determined that the
term "statutory maximum" applied to the presumptive sentencing
ranges established under Washington State's sentencing guide-
lines. 246
This was huge. Professor Steven Chanenson suggested, "Blake-
ly is one of the most, if not the most, significant constitutional
criminal procedure decisions in generations."247 Professor Douglas
Berman claimed that it was bigger, writing, "Blakely is the big-
gest criminal justice decision not just of this past term, not just of
this decade, not just of the Rehnquist Court, but perhaps in the
241. Id. (citation omitted).
242. Jeannie, comment to Sentencing Law and Policy: West Coast Offense, SENT'G. L. &
POL'Y (Oct. 6, 2004, 2:35 PM), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_1aw-andpolicy/
2004/10/west coast_ offe.html#comments.
243. United States v. Jones, 143 Fed. App'x 230, 231-32 (11th Cir. 2005).
244. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.
296 (2004).
245. 542 U.S. at 301 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 301 (2000)).
246. Id. at 303-04.
247. Chanenson, supra note 239, at 20.
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history of the Supreme Court."248 Even Supreme Court justices
joined the chorus of hyperbole. In the language of a Delphic
Oracle, Justice O'Connor warned in her Blakely dissent, "What I
have feared most has now come to pass: Over 20 years of sentenc-
ing reform are all but lost, and tens of thousands of criminal
judgments are in jeopardy."2 49 Other commentators described
Blakely in the language of natural disasters.250 They did so not be-
cause of the case's impact on state sentencing schemes, but be-
cause the Washington State guidelines were not obviously distin-
guishable from the federal Guidelines.1' Many observers
predicted that the federal Guidelines would be struck down as
unconstitutional, as well.25
And they were, in Booker.53
Booker was a strange decision, split into two different five-to-
four opinions: (1) a constitutional holding that said the mandato-
ry Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment principle articulated
in Apprendi,254 and (2) a remedial holding that corrected the con-
stitutional violation by striking the portions of the Sentencing
Reform Act that made the Guidelines mandatory.255 Only one jus-
248. Douglas Berman, Supreme Court Cleanup in Aisle 4, SLATE (July 16, 2004, 8:04
PM), http://slate.com/toolbar.aspx?action=printed&id=2104014.
249. 542 U.S. at 326 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
250. See, e.g., United States v. Mueffleman, 327 F. Supp. 2d 79, 84 (D. Mass. 2004)
(Gertner, J.) ("seismic"); Larry Kupers, Proposal for a Viable Federal Sentencing Scheme
in the Wake of Blakely v. Washington, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 28, 28 (2004) ("a tsunami");
Letter from Albert W. Alschuler, Professor, Univ. of Chi. Law School, to Orrin Hatch, Sen-
ator, and Patrick Leahy, Senator (July 19, 2004), available at http://sentencing.typepad.
com/sentencing_1awandpolicy/files/alschuler blakely response.doc (last visited Dec. 3,
2010) ("a tidal wave"); Jeff Chorney, O'Connor to Judges: Explain Yourselves, LAW.COM
(July 23, 2004), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1090180161284 (quoting Justice
O'Connor) ("a number 10 earthquake"); Douglas Berman, Principle Versus Pragmatism,
SENT'G L. & POL'Y (Aug. 19, 2004, 8:21 AM), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing-
law and-policy/2004/08/principle-.versu.html ("Godzilla rampaging through Tokyo during
a level 10 (on the Richter scale) earthquake. . . .").
251. See Jon Wool & Don Stemen, Aggravated Sentencing: Blakely v. Washington:
Practical Implications for State Sentencing Systems, POL'Y & PRAC. REV., Aug. 2004, at 1-
2, available at http://www.vera.org/content/aggravated-sentencing-blakely-washington-pra
ctical-implications-state-sentencing-systems (describing state sentencing systems that
could implicate the Blakely ruling in half the states).
252. See Frank 0. Bowman, III, Train Wreck? Or Can the Federal Sentencing System
Be Saved? A Plea for Rapid Reversal of Blakely v. Washington, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 217,
239-40 (2004); Note, The Unconstitutionality of Determinate Sentencing in Light of the
Supreme Court's "Elements" Jurisprudence, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1236, 1252-53 (2004).
253. 543 U.S. 220, 226-27 (2005).
254. Id. at 244.
255. Id. at 245 (holding 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(b)(1) and 3742(e) unconstitutional).
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tice-Justice Ginsburg-joined both opinions, and she did not
provide any explanation of her reasoning.2 ,6 The result of Booker,
though, was clear: the Guidelines were no longer mandatory.257
They were advisory.25* To many, the result seemed like the best of
all possible worlds .259 Advisory Guidelines were similar to what
the Judicial Conference of the United States had once consi-
dered, 260 to what the Federal Judicial Center found appealing to
many judges, 261 and to what the American College of Trial Law-
yers had proposed.262
Many commentators thought Congress would react to Booker
with legislation (the so-called Booker-fix).263 Indeed, Congress held
hearings on the subject,264 and a "topless guidelines" proposal, in-
256. See id. at 225.
257. Id. at 245 (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) is mandatory and thus unconstitu-
tional).
258. Id. at 246.
259. See, e.g., Robert J. Anello & Jodi Misher Peikin, Evolving Roles in Federal Sea-
tencing: The Post-Booker/Fanfan World, 1 FED. CTS. L. REV. 301, 331-32 (2006); Douglas A.
Berman, Perspectives and Principles for the Post-Booker World, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 231,
231-32 (2005); Douglas A. Berman, Tweaking Booker: Advisory Guidelines in the Federal
System, 43 Hous. L. REV. 341, 375 (2006); James G. Carr, Some Thoughts on Sentencing
Post-Booker, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 295, 295, 297 (2005).
260. See REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 90 (1979), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/JudicialConference/
Proceedings/Proceedings.aspx?doc=/uscourts/FederalCourts/judconf/proceedings/l979-09.
pdf (noting that several legislative initiatives existed to reduce sentencing disparity, and
concluding that no Conference action should be taken until the legislative objectives and
criteria were established, but noting that "[i]f Congress should fail to adopt new measures
relating to sentencing, the Judicial Conference should consider recommending guidelines
for use at the discretion of district judges to reduce undesirable disparity in sentencing").
261. See MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON & SCOTT A. GILBERT, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES: RESULTS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER'S 1996 SURVEY
3 (1997), available at http://www.fic.gov/public/pdf.nsfllookup/gssurvey.pdfl/&file/gssurvey.
pdf ("About two-thirds of district judges and chief probation officers responding to this
question, and more than half of the circuit judges responding, expressed a preference for
advisory guidelines, while less than one-third of each group preferred the former system of
discretion-based sentencing with parole.").
262. See AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, supra note 51, at 35 ("The College therefore
proposes that the existing Guidelines be replaced with nonbinding guidelines that judges
may use to inform their sentencing discretion, but from which judges may depart for good
reasons explained on the record and with the sentence subject to review on appeal for
abuse of discretion.").
263. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Assessing Federal Sentencing After Booker, 17 FED.
SENT'G REP. 291, 291-93 (2005). But see Robert C. Scott, Chairman, U.S. House Subcomm.
on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec., Plenary Speech at the 2008 Fall Conference of
the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section 11 (Oct. 24, 2008) (on file with au-
thor) ("Booker is not the problem. Booker is the fix.").
264. See, e.g., United States v. Booker: One Year Later-Chaos or Status Quo?: Hearing
before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the Comm. On the Judi-
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itially floated by Professor Frank Bowman, generated a great
deal of discussion.2 65 The Chair of the House Judiciary Committee,
James Sensenbrenner, even introduced a topless guidelines
bi1 266-"guidelines gone wild"267-but Congress did not pass any
new legislation, and the courts were left to wrestle with the ques-
tion of just how much weight the now-advisory Guidelines should
receive. Some judges, noting that the Guidelines incorporated the
other sentencing factors enumerated at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), sug-
gested that the Guidelines should be entitled to "heavy
weight"268-and the patterns of federal sentencing showed that
judges were generally still sentencing within the Guidelines,
much as if Booker had never happened 6 5-but other judges sug-
gested that the Guidelines were merely one § 3553(a) factor
among many, and entitled to no special deference. 210
Since Booker, the Court has issued additional guidance on the
topic. In Cunningham v. California, the Court reiterated that
"under the Sixth Amendment, any fact that exposes a defendant
to a greater potential sentence must be found by a jury, not a
judge, and established beyond a reasonable doubt, not merely by
a preponderance of the evidence."2 71 In Rita v. United States, the
Court held that appellate courts were free to "apply a presump-
ciary, 109th Cong. 119 (2006).
265. See Am. Bar Ass'n Criminal Justice Section, Report on Booker and Recommenda-
tion, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 335, 338 (2005) (noting that there are no convenient "quick fix-
es" to Booker, and that "[t]he 'Bowman fix' presents numerous problems").
266. See Sentencing Fairness and Equity Restoration Act, H.R. 6254, 109th Cong. §
2(a)(1)-(2) (2006).
267. See Frank 0. Bowman, III, Professor, Ind. Univ. Sch. of Law, Testimony Before
the United States Sentencing Commission, (Nov. 17, 2004), available at http://www.ussc.
gov/LegislativeandPublicAffairs/Public._Hearings-andMeetings/20041117//111704-pan
eltwo.pdf ('I will get around to talking about what I prefer to call 'topless guidelines,' or as
Doug Berman christened them, 'guidelines gone wild."').
268. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 912 (D. Utah 2005). Asto-
nishingly, Judge Paul Cassell issued the opinion in Wilson just one day after the Supreme
Court issued its opinion in Booker, prompting some commentators-well, actually, just
me-to speculate that Cassell is actually a cyborg, sent back in time to alter the develop-
ment of post-Booker jurisprudence. Cf. THE TERMINATOR (Hemdale Film 1984).
269. See Douglas Berman, Same Old Sentencing, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 26, 2005, at 27 (sug-
gesting that "in the wake of Booker, federal sentencing practices and outcomes have not
really changed much (at least not yet)" and concluding that judicial culture influences ac-
tual sentencing patterns more than jurisprudential limits).
270. See, e.g., United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984, 985 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
271. 549 U.S. 270, 281 (2007). Furthermore, any system that does not permit judges to
sentence outside a recommended range based on "'[gleneral objectives of sentencing"' ab-
sent a "factfinding anchor" also violates the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 279-80 (alteration in
original).
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tion of reasonableness to a district court sentence that reflects a
proper application of the Sentencing Guidelines." 272 In Gall v.
United States, the Supreme Court answered the reciprocal ques-
tion in the negative, holding that appellate courts are not free to
presume that outside-the-Guidelines sentences are unreasona-
ble.273
Since Booker, within the context of crack-cocaine sentences, the
Supreme Court has held that judges may consider the 100:1 dis-
parity between federal crack and powder-form cocaine sentences
when imposing a sentence "sufficient, but not greater than neces-
sary;" 27 that "district courts are entitled to reject and vary cate-
gorically from the crack-cocaine Guidelines based on a policy dis-
agreement with those Guidelines;" and that, when they do, they
may use a different ratio.275
Most recently, in Nelson v. United States, the Court re-
emphasized just how advisory the Guidelines truly are, holding
that a district court commits reversible error whenever it treats
the Guidelines as presumptively reasonable. 276 "The Guidelines
are not only not mandatory on sentencing courts; they are also
not to be presumed reasonable."27 7
The result is peculiar. The Court's holding in Booker requires
sentencing courts to begin by correctly calculating the advisory
Guidelines sentence. 278 But the Guidelines sentence, if imposed
without further analysis, constitutes reversible error under Nel-
son.27 Thus, the sentencing court must go through all the calcula-
tions associated with the Guidelines, and then engage in a second
272. 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007). Despite the presumption of reasonableness available to
appellate judges, district judges could not presume the Guidelines to be reasonable. Id. at
351.
273. 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
274. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007). Since Kimbrough, the ratio be-
tween crack and powder-form cocaine was reduced from 100:1 to 18:1 when President Ob-
ama signed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 2, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372
into law on August 3, 2010.
275. See Spears v. United States, 555 U.S._ , 128 S. Ct. 840, 843-44 (2009).
276. 555 U.S. _, _ , 129 S. Ct. 890, 892 (2009) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 49-50).
277. Id. at-, 129 S. Ct. at 892.
278. See id. at _, 129 S. Ct. at 891-92 ("[The sentencing court must first calculate
the Guidelines range, and then consider what sentence is appropriate for the individual
defendant in light of the statutory sentencing factors, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), explaining any
variance from the former with reference to the latter.").
279. See id. at _, 129 S. Ct. at 891-92.
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layer of analysis, using all of the § 3553(a) factors to demonstrate
why the sentence is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to
comply with the purposes of sentencing.2 M
Frankly, it is a little like the Ptolemaic system of astronomy
that Thomas Kuhn described in The Structure of Scientific Revo-
lutions.281 According to Kuhn, as the accuracy of celestial observa-
tions improved, the complexity of the Ptolemaic models (positing
a geocentric model of the solar system) had to increase correspon-
dingly.28 2 Scientists like Galileo Galilei found evidence that con-
flicted with the geocentric model, so epicycles were added to exist-
ing astronomic cycles in order to maintain the calculated
positions of planets at their observed positions.2 83 Eventually, the
system became so complicated 284-So increasingly elaborate-that
the Ptolemaic model could no longer be sustained, and was over-
taken by the Copernican model (positing a heliocentric model of
the solar system).28 5
Of course, the laws of Congress are not the laws of nature.2 86
The creation of the legislator is different than the discovery of the
natural scientist. But if the Guidelines are indeed advisory, there
are steps that could make them far more useful to judges con-
fronted with the awesome responsibility of sentencing. Perhaps
the Guidelines are in need of their own Galileo.287
280. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text (listing purposes of sentencing).
281. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (Otto Neurath
et al. eds., 2d ed. 1970) (1962).
282. See id. at 68 (citation omitted).
283. Id. at 268-69. Ptolemy introduced epicycles (small combinations of circles) into his
geocentric system of astronomy to account for small irregularities in the observed posi-
tions of the planets. Ptolemy's successors, like Apollonius and Hipparchus, added more
epicycles, making the system so elaborate that Copernicus eventually rejected Ptolemy's
system and its "technical minutia." See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE COPERNICAN REVOLUTION:
PLANETARY ASTRONOMY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF WESTERN THOUGHT 64-72 (2d ed. 1966).
Galileo's observations provided evidence that conflicted with the geocentric model of as-
tronomy, and supported the heliocentric model posited by Copernicus. See id. at 219-24.
284. See supra Part III.A.2 (describing the complexity of the Guidelines).
285. KUHN, supra note 281, at 69.
286. See KURT VONNEGUT, God's Law, in PALM SUNDAY: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL
COLLAGE 9-12 (1981) (distinguishing between divine law, natural law, and mere human
law by comparing them to an ace trumping a king or queen in a hand of cards).
287. ANDREA. Unhappy is the land that breeds no hero.
GALILEO. No, Andrea: Unhappy is the land that needs a hero.
BERTOLT BRECHT, GALILEO 115 (Charles Laughton trans., 1966) (1940).
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I will describe some of the steps that a sentencing Galileo could
take in Part IV, Sara, when I talk about what you could be.
IV. ALTERNATIVES
Sara, I already explained that under today's (Ptolemaic) law,
courts must begin by calculating the Guidelines, 288 but the Guide-
lines they calculate are not binding."' The process, not the prod-
uct, is mandatory.
The Guidelines are advisory. Not only are district judges not
compelled to sentence within the Guidelines, but they may not
presume a Guidelines sentence is reasonable.290 Thus the Guide-
lines may (and must) serve as a starting point, but judges must
find their own ways, using the § 3553(a) factors to guide them.
Today, the Guidelines are informational. They do not tell
judges which penological goals should dominate, nor how much
weight to afford to sentencing factors,'291 and they no longer bar
judges from considering those factors deemed irrelevant by the
Commission.292 Once again, as long as the Guidelines are correctly
calculated and as long as the § 3553(a) factors are adequately ad-
dressed, sentencing judges are free to impose any sentence per-
mitted by law, subject to appeal under a standard of "reasonable-
ness."293 It is much like a return to the old days of indeterminate
288. Nelson v. United States, 555 U.S. -_,_ 129 S. Ct. 890, 891 (2009).
289. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
290. Nelson, 555 U.S. at _, 129 S. Ct. at 892 (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 50 (2007)).
291. See Bowman, supra note 141, at 322 (describing similar sentencing disparities
when a hypothetical heroin dealer appears before a Kantian judge and a utilitarian judge,
and noting that "[b]oth positions are plausible, shared by many serious persons, and ra-
tionally and morally defensible'). This is not a purely abstract possibility, but one with
practical consequences for the federal bench:
"[L]iberals" tend to believe that factors external to the offender are responsi-
ble for criminal behavior. Rehabilitation is more of a sentencing goal for these
judges, leading to greater reliance on probation and less concern with retri-
bution. "Conservatives" believe that offenders choose to commit crimes. They
are more punishment-oriented and tend to impose longer prison terms.
Paul J. Hofer, et al., The Effect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines on Inter-Judge Sen-
tencing Disparity, 90 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 239, 250 (1999).
292. See Brian J. Foley, The Mass Incarceration Crisis as an Opportunity to Rethink
Blame, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 5-7 (2009).
293. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007) ("[C]ourts of appeals may ap-
ply a presumption of reasonableness to a district court sentence that reflects a proper ap-
plication of the Sentencing Guidelines").
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sentencing, 294 except there is no longer a parole mechanism to re-
duce the sentences on the back end.195
George Santayana famously warned that "those who cannot
remember the past are condemned to repeat it,"296 and under a
system of advisory Guidelines, there is some risk of returning to
the "bad old days" 29 7 of sentencing disparity."98 Although data from
the Commission suggests that national sentencing patterns have
not changed dramatically after Booker,299 some circuits are show-
ing greater fidelity to Guidelines sentencing than others.300 Under
the existing system, it is not difficult to imagine that identical de-
fendants might receive disparate sentences, based on nothing
more than philosophical views of the judges assigned to the cas-
es. 301
This is worrying.
And Sara, it would be heartbreaking to see all your promise
lost.
294. See Jonathan Chiu, Comment, United States v. Booker: The Demise of Mandatory
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Return of Indeterminate Sentencing, 39 U. RICH. L.
REV. 1311, 1342-44 (2005).
295. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (describing prospective abolition of pa-
role by SRA).
296. GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON 284 (2d ed. 1929).
297. See Blakely v. Washington and the Future of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 108th Cong. 5 (2004) (statement of Sen. Patrick
Leahy, Member, S. Judiciary Comm.) (referring to the "bad old days" of disparity under
indeterminate sentencing).
298. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN FEDERAL SENT-
ENCING PRACTICES: AN UPDATE OF THE BOOKER REPORT'S MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION
ANALYSIS 2 (2010), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research/ResearchPublications/20
10/20100311/20100311_MultivariateRegressionAnalysisReport.pdf ("Black male of-
fenders received longer sentences than white male offenders. The differences in sentence
length have increased steadily since Booker.").
299. See BOOKER REPORT, supra note 7, at 58 ("Despite the initial increase in the impo-
sition of non-government-sponsored, below-range sentences, a relatively stable month-to-
month trend was immediately established and has continued.").
300. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2008 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS tbls.N, N-DC, N1 to N11 (2008), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Dataand_
Statistics/AnnualReportsandSourcebooks/2008/SBTOC08.htm (noting that some cir-
cuits report rates of within-Guidelines sentences well below the national average, while
others report rates well above the national average). Whether circuits should aspire to
Guidelines fidelity for the sake of parity is an altogether different question; some might
suggest that the parsimony provision obligates judges to sentence outside the Guidelines
in some cases, and that doing so is laudable. See Sandra D. Jordan, Have We Come Full
Circle? Judicial Sentencing Discretion Revived in Booker and Fanfan, 33 PEPP. L. REV.
615, 665-70 (2006).
301. See supra note 291 (describing competing philosophical approaches to sentencing
that are each reasonable, yet produce different outcomes).
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Despite the flaws of the Guidelines, 302 there is a great deal of
value in structured sentencing.Aos It would be tragic if the rever-
berations of Booker incited Congress to enact more mandatory
minimum sentences. 30 4
The solution lies neither in straightjacketing federal judges,
nor in coercing their compliance with threats of reversal and in-
vestigation,3 0 but with providing them with the information they
need to craft thoughtful, wise, and appropriate sentences.
After all, judges do not wake up in the morning with the inten-
tion of frustrating members of Congress. They do not go out of
their way to depart from the Guidelines for the sake of asserting
their judicial independence. They depart downward when, based
on the evidence before them, the Guidelines call for sentences
that appear to be "blindly unjust."306
If we provide judges with the necessary information to impose
fair sentences, they will do so.
In 2009, Chief United States Probation Officer Greg Forest
made this point at the first of the Commission's regional hear-
ings."o' He suggested that "the data collected by the Sentencing
302. See supra Part III.A (describing flaws of the Guidelines).
303. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF STRUCTURED
SENTENCING xv-xvi, http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/strsent.pdf ("The most promising model
is sentencing guidelines developed by sentencing commissions.").
304. See United States v. Wilson, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1287-88 (D. Utah 2005) (sug-
gesting that one potential congressional response to Booker is the passage of more manda-
tory minimum sentences). Mandatory minimum sentencing has been widely condemned by
expert agencies, academics, justices, legislators, and presidents. See, e.g., U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 56-63 (1991) (identifying problems with mandatory minimum sentences);
116 CONG. REC. H33314 (1970), reprinted in 3 FED. SENT'G REP. 108 (1990) (remarks of
then-Congressman George H.W. Bush) (same); TONRY, supra note 4, at 5-6 (same); Brey-
er, supra note 104, at 182-85 (same); Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of Congress in Sentencing:
The United States Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences, and the
Search for a Certain and Effective Sentencing System, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 185, 193-
95 (1993) (same).
305. See supra note 182 and accompanying text (describing investigation of Judge Ro-
senbaum).
306. See John S. Martin Jr., Why Mandatory Minimums Make No Sense, 18 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHIC PUB. POL'Y 311, 312 (2004) ('The reason the judges are opposed to man-
datory minimums is not that they are power hungry but rather that they see on a day-to-
day basis the injustice that results from inflexibility in sentencing, whether it be a result
of mandatory minimums or the result of a restriction of judicial discretion under the sen-
tencing guidelines."); supra note 122 and accompanying text (quoting Justice Kennedy as
criticizing "blindly unjust guidelines').
307. See Greg Forest, Chief U.S. Prob. Officer, W. Dist. N.C., Statement to the United
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Commission may be equally important-or more important-than
the guidelines it promulgates. Sentencing data and data integrity
are perhaps more important now than they have ever been."308
Along similar lines, last year, attorney James Felman observed:
While the United States Sentencing Commission's ability to dictate
specific sentences in individual cases has been weakened by the now
advisory status of its Guidelines, the Commission's importance in
the collection, analysis, and dissemination of sentencing data is now
greater than ever. Under advisory Guidelines, district courts are
empowered to consider a much richer mix of information in sentenc-
ing. District courts are now free to craft much more individualized
sentences in light of the particular circumstances of specific defen-
dants. But to do so and be affirmed on appeal, district courts must
give specific and detailed reasons for their sentencing determina-
tions. It is for this reason that there has perhaps never been a better
time for the study of sentencing policy than now. The reasons given
by district courts, if collated, analyzed by the Commission, and then
disseminated by the Commission, can give rise to the most expansive
wealth of sentencing data and jurisprudence in our nation's history.
Trends in sentencing considerations can now be recorded with detail.
Success or failure with differing sentencing options involving other-
wise similar offenders and offenses may now be documented and
analyzed to a degree not previously possible.3 0 9
Forest and Felman are not the first to suggest something along
these lines. Before them, Professor Marc Miller described a sen-
tencing information system, and extolled its many virtues.' 0 Be-
fore Miller, criminologist Norval Morris described an analogous
approach,311 and before Morris, sociologist Max Weber imagined a
States Sentencing Commission Regional Hearing on the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the
Passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: View From the Probation Office 8 (Feb. 10,
2009), available at http://www.ussc.govfLegislative-andPublic_Affiars/PublicHearings
andMeetings/20090210/ForestLtestimony.pdf.
308. See id. at 8-9. The focus on data provides a sound answer to the questions posed
by Frank Bowman in the wake of Blakely. See Bowman, supra note 252, at 242 ("It is even
more difficult to understand what continuing role the Sentencing Commission could play if
the product of its work, guidelines rules, were deemed void ab initio. After sentencing,
would judges be obliged to report to the Sentencing Commission their factual findings or
their reasons for adhering to or varying from Guidelines prescriptions? If the Guidelines
are to be merely useful benchmarks, what function would the Sentencing Commission
serve? Would it continue to exist at all?').
309. James E. Felman, The State of the Sentencing Union: A Call for Fundamental
Reexamination, 20 FED. SENT'G REP. 337, 338 (2008).
310. See Miller, supra note 166, at 1370-80.
311. See Norval R. Morris, Sentencing Convicted Criminals, 27 AUSTL. L.J. 186, 200
(1953).
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kind of sentencing computer that would collect relevant facts and
dispense a just sentence.112
Even Marvin Frankel, the patron saint of sentencing guide-
lines, acknowledged that computers could be useful in bringing
parity and fairness to sentencing.33 Writing in 1972 (when com-
puters were still the size of refrigerators and fed by punch
cards),'314 Frankel suggested:
It is not necessary, or desirable, to imagine that sentencing can be
completely computerized. At the same time, the possibility of using
computers as an aid toward orderly thought in sentencing need not
be discounted in advance. James V. Bennett, for years the able Di-
rector of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, noted the possibility some
time ago.3 1
Sentencing software already exists. In China, for example, a
program has been used by a court in the city of Zibo, guiding the
decisionmaking of sentencing judges in more than one hundred
different types of offenses.316 Analogous software exists in the
United States, too. Practitioners working with the Guidelines at a
312. See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 886 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich
eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1978) (1913) (envisioning a system
in which the judge could drop the relevant facts into a kind of penological slot machine,
and wait for the appropriate decision to be rendered automatically). For a contrasting sug-
gestion that sentencing is fundamentally about moral judgments and that a mathematical
approach is inappropriate, see H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals, 71 HARv. L. REV. 593, 613 (1958) ("To a judge striking a balance among these
claims, with all the discretion and perplexities involved, his task seems as plain an exam-
ple of the exercise of moral judgment as could be; and it seems to be the polar opposite of
some mechanical application of a tariff of penalties fixing a sentence careless of the moral
claims which in our system have to be weighed.").
313. See generally FRANKEL, supra note 39 (arguing for sentencing guidelines).
314. See Print Advertisements, HP COMPUTER MUSEUM, http://www.hpmuseum.netiup
loadhtmlFile/PrintAds/Adl972_3000_2100-19.jpg (last visited Dec. 3, 2010); New Media
Timeline, POYNTER ONLINE (May 5, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.poynter.org/content/con
tentview.asp?id=75845. Computing power has improved dramatically since Frankel pub-
lished his book. See, e.g., J.C. Oleson, "Drown the World": Imperfect Necessity and Total
Cultural Revolution, 3 UNBOUND 19, 71 (2007) (noting that "we use desktop computers
that possess five to ten times more computational power than the system that put man on
the moon"). Prior to the SRA, the federal courts had little experience with computers of
any kind. I have been told that the first computers in the federal judiciary were those used
by the Sentencing Commission.
315. FRANKEL, supra note 39, at 114-15.
316. See Douglas A. Berman, China Does Guidelines One Better, SENT'G L. & POL'Y
(Sept. 13, 2006, 5:40 PM), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencinglaw-and-policy/2006/
09/chinadoes-guid.html.
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basic level may find value in a free online calculator, 3 1  or down-
load freeware for use on personal digital assistants ("PDAs").3 18
But instead of developing software that merely mirrors existing
Guidelines, automating the lookup tables and the calculations, it
is possible to develop a more powerful sentencing information
system that provides judges with meaningful information about
recidivism. Merely automating an unscientific system will not
make it sound, 3 9 but a philosophical shift toward the use of out-
come measures would be profound, and computers could make
this effort much easier. Given recent developments in the field of
risk/needs instruments,320 and drawing upon sentencing informa-
tion systems developed by other jurisdictions,321 a new approach
to sentencing is not an impossible goal.322
Imagine that a mid-level crack dealer with three previous state
convictions appears before a judge for sentencing. As you know,
Sara, this happens with some frequency in the federal courts. In-
stead of requiring a probation officer to go through tortured
Guidelines calculations to determine the adjusted offense level
317. SENTENCING.US, http://www.sentencing.us/ (providing free online Guidelines cal-
culator) (last visited Dec. 3, 2010).
318. See Federal Guidelines Klein Calculator 1.0, POCKETGEAR.com, http://www.pocket
gear.comlen/usd/4802861,product-details.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2010) (providing PDA
sentencing software).
319. See supra Part III.A.2 ("[Dlraping something . . . in the trappings of mathematics
and science does not make it empirical.").
320. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09(2) (Council Draft No. 2, 2008)
(encouraging sentencing commissions to develop "offender risk-assessment instruments or
processes, supported by current and ongoing recidivism research of felons in the state,
that will estimate the relative risks that individual felons pose to public safety through
future criminal conduct"); D. A. Andrews et al., Classification for Effective Rehabilitation:
Rediscovering Psychology, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 19, 19-23 (1990) (describing the evolu-
tion of assessment tools for criminal justice).
321. See Miller, supra note 166, at 1370-75 (2005) (describing sentencing information
systems in operation in Canada, Scotland, and New South Wales (Australia)).
322. See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, "The Wisdom We Have Lost" Sentencing
Information and Its Uses, 58 STAN. L. REV. 361, 371 (2005) ('The Sentencing Guidelines in
the federal system became more voluntary after Booker v. United States. In more flexible
systems the possible uses of well-organized and usable sentencing data are even more ob-
vious. Data and analyses of the patterns and practices of other judges in similar cases and
across all cases can help to inform judges about whether the Guidelines are reasonably
applied to the case before them and, in any case, what a reasonable sentence might be.
Since most of the information necessary for a functional sentencing information system is
already collected in the federal system, a directive from Congress could quickly make such
a system a reality."); see also Matthew Kleiman et al., Using Risk Assessment to Inform
Sentencing Decisions for Nonviolent Offenders in Virginia, 53 CRIME & DELINQ. 106, 106,
110-11 (2007) (describing use of risk assessment instruments to divert "25% of nonviolent,
prison-bound offenders into alternative sanction programs").
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and criminal history score, the sentencing software would auto-
matically capture key details (e.g., the defendant's name, date of
birth, and offense of conviction) from existing court documents.
The judge would verify that the information is correct, add any
additional relevant data (drug weight, prior convictions, or any
other variables), and the software would display a scatter plot.
The severity of sentence would be plotted on the horizontal axis
(representing the entire spectrum of terms of imprisonment
available under the statute)32 3 and the duration without a new ar-
rest ("survival") would be plotted on the vertical axis. Each point
in the cloud of the scatter plot would represent a previous case
(offenders matched for offender and offense characteristics), and
by clicking on any single point with a mouse, the judge could pull
up the specifics of that case: the name and photo of the offender,
the offense of conviction, the characteristics of the offender, and
the particulars of the sentence imposed. The judge would be able
to review any educational, vocational, or treatment programs that
successful offenders had completed while serving their sentences,
323. The existing Guidelines do not encompass fines, community service, or other al-
ternatives to incarceration as discrete sentences. See TONRY, supra note 4, at 95 ("The fed-
eral guidelines allow no independent role for intermediate punishments like fines, house
arrest, intensively supervised probation, or community service. The only freestanding sen-
tences authorized are prison and probation. . . ."). Fines are imposed, but the imposition of
a large fine, for example, does not offset the term of imprisonment. See id. A sentencing
information system that canvasses the entire statutory range of sentencing alternatives,
however, should include recidivism data for noncustodial penalties, as well as for terms of
incarceration. Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing, in THE HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
542, 556-57 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998). A sophisticated system may overcome the problem
described by Reitz:
One of the great unsolved puzzles of the 1980s and 1990s is how to write
sentencing guidelines for nonprison sanctions. Although there has been wide-
spread agreement among policy makers and academics that creative exploita-
tion of "intermediate punishments" (defined as those sanctions in between the
harshness of prison and the laxity of regular probation) would be a good idea
in principle, and might be the only realistic way to stem the tide of prison
growth, no American jurisdiction has yet implemented a systemwide program
of intermediate punishments that has meaningfully diverted offender popula-
tions away from incarceration sanctions.
A large part of the problem, in the view of experienced sentencing refor-
mers like Michael Tonry and Kay Knapp, is that the machinery of sentencing
guidelines has not yet become fine-tuned enough to give structure to trial
court decisions about intermediate sanctions.
Id. (citations omitted). One mechanism to incorporate intermediate sanctions into a sen-
tencing information system of this kind is the use of punishment units or exchange equi-
valencies, such as those considered by the states of Oregon and Washington. See Michael
Tonry, Intermediate Sanctions in Sentencing Guidelines, 23 CRIME & JUST. 199, 208-09
(1998) (describing efforts to equate prison terms with noncustodial penalties).
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and to search online for available, equivalent programs. If de-
sired, the underlying documents associated with any of the pre-
vious cases could be retrieved with a click of the mouse.324
By concentrating on points near the top of the vertical axis (in-
dividuals who went long periods of time without a new arrest),
the judge could engage in actuarial sentencing and impose a sen-
tence that was effective in reducing recidivism among similar de-
fendants convicted of similar crimes.3 15 A judge could divert cor-
rectional resources from low-risk offenders (who actually become
more likely to reoffend if oversupervised)326 to high-risk offenders
in greater need of intensive services. Defendants who are statisti-
cally most likely to recidivate could be sentenced to longer sen-
tences (within the statutory range),327 while those who present lit-
324. These documents could be accessed through the judiciary's case management/
electronic case files (CM/ECF) system. See generally PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT
ELECTRONIC RECORDS, http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/cmeeflecffaq.html (last visited Dec. 3,
2010) (describing CM/ECF).
325. The notion of actuarial sentencing and managing recidivism may signify a change
in penology. See Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the
Emerging Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, in THE CRIMINOLOGY THEORY
READER 451, 451-66 (Stuart Henry & Werner Einstadter eds., 1998) (describing the emer-
gence of risk prediction, the shift from rehabilitation and crime control to a focus on man-
agement, and the targeting of offenders in the aggregate rather than individualizing pu-
nishment, as hallmarks of the "new penology").
326. See, e.g., Christopher T. Lowenkamp & Edward J. Latessa, Understanding the
Risk Principle: How and Why Correctional Interventions Can Harm Low-Risk Offenders, in
NAT'L INST. OF CORRECTIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TOPICS IN COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS
3-8 (2004), http://nicic.gov/library/period265 (noting that providing unnecessary services to
low-risk offenders wastes resources that could be devoted to more serious offenders and
affirmatively increases the risk that low-risk offenders will reoffend).
327. Criminological research suggests that a modest number of offenders are responsi-
ble for a disproportionate amount of crime. See, e.g., MARVIN E. WOLFGANG ET AL.,
DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT 68-69, 89, 102-03 (1972) (reporting that 6% of delin-
quents were responsible for 52% of offenses, including 71% of murders and 69% of aggra-
vated assaults); Sarnoff A. Mednick, A Bio-Social Theory of the Learning of Law-Abiding
Behavior, in BIOSOCIAL BASES OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 1, 1-2 (Sarnoff A. Mednick & Karl
0. Christiansen eds., 1977) (reporting that one percent of men in a Copenhagen birth co-
hort of 30,000 were responsible for more than half the crime). If one can selectively inca-
pacitate high-rate offenders, it may be possible to substantially reduce the crime rate
while avoiding the considerable human and fiscal costs associated with incarcerating large
swaths of the population. See GREENWOOD & ABRAHAMSE, supra note 17 passim, a seminal
work on selective incapacitation, suggesting that a seven-factor analysis would allow crim-
inal justice professionals to incapacitate high-crime offenders, while subjecting other of-
fenders to noncustodial punishments or brief terms incarceration. Greenwood's scale was
the subject of vigorous debate. See, e.g., Jacqueline Cohen, Incapacitation as a Strategy for
Crime Control: Possibilities and Pitfalls, 5 CRIME & JUST. 1, 37-54 (1983); Andrew von
Hirsch & Don M. Gottfredson, Selective Incapacitation: Some Queries About Research De-
sign and Equity, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 11, 12-13, 16-51 (1984). But whether
or not the Greenwood scale is methodologically or ethically acceptable, there is good rea-
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tie risk of recidivism could be sentenced to brief terms of incarce-
ration or noncustodial sentences.328 Obviously, the software could
not guarantee that the mid-level crack dealer will avoid re-arrest,
but it could provide the judge with empirical information, and it
could suggest whether a long or short sentence is more likely to
reduce future crime. It could indicate the programs that reduce
recidivism and allow the judge to use the resources of the crimi-
nal justice system far more efficiently.32*
Perhaps Oliver Wendell Holmes was not too far off-base when
he suggested, "For the rational study of the law the black-letter
son to think that risk-assessment instruments may once again become attractive to deci-
sionmakers in the criminal justice system. In 2008, the United States incarcerated more
than 2.2 million persons in prisons and jails; more than 1-in-100 adults were behind bars.
See JENNIFER WARREN, PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 31, at 1-5 (2009), available at
http://www. peweenteronthes-
tates.org/uploadedfiles/PSPP_1in3lreport FINAL WEB_- 3_.26_ 09.pdf. If one counts indi-
viduals on probation or parole (as well as those who are incarcerated), more than 7.3 mil-
lion people were under state or federal supervision in 2008. Id. at 5. However, in recent
years, as U.S. budgets have been slashed, many jurisdictions have struggled to operate
their prisons and correctional facilities with available funds. David L. Hudson, Jr., Cutting
Costs .. . and Courts: Judicial Resources Dwindle as States Cope with Budget Crises, 89
A.B.A. J. 16, 16-17 (2003). The situation is perhaps most dire in California. See Coleman
v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV 5-90-0520 LKK JFM P., 2009 WL 2430820, at *1, *115-16
(E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009) (concluding that "California's prisons are bursting at the seams
and are impossible to manage" and ordering that the state reduce the prison population to
137.5% of its design capacity within two years so as to comport with minimal constitution-
al standards). But California is not unique. See, e.g., Jeff Carlton, Milestone: Inmate Popu-
lation Poised to Dip, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 20, 2009, at A30. While the American rage to pu-
nish may not have abated, the ability of states to indulge their punitive impulse may be
financially limited. See id. ("The inmate population has risen steadily since the early
1970s as states adopted get-tough policies that sent more people to prison and kept them
there longer. But tight budgets now have states rethinking these policies and the costs
that come with them."). Any instrument or scale that allows decisionmakers to accurately
identify high-rate offenders may be welcomed as a means to respond to manage social and
fiscal conditions.
328. See BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS ET AL., OFFENDER RISK
ASSESSMENT IN VIRGINIA 10, 17, 20-22 (2002), available at http://www.vcsc.virginia.gov/
riskoff.rpt.pdf (analyzing a potential offender risk assessment instrument in Virginia by
which high-risk offenders are imprisoned while those who are statistically unlikely to re-
cidivate receive noncustodial, alternative sentences).
329. See AM. BAR ASS'N JUSTICE KENNEDY COMM'N, REPORTS WITH RECOMMENDATIONS
TO THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES 4 (2004) [hereinafter KENNEDY COMM'N], available at
http://www.abanet.orglmedialjkcres.html (follow "Introduction" hyperlink) (last visited
Dec. 3, 2010) ("Our resources are misspent, our punishments too severe, our sentences too
long." (emphasis added) (quoting Justice Kennedy)). Risk/needs assessment tools can allow
courts to allocate criminal justice resources to high-risk offenders-who will benefit from
them-while diverting resources from low-risk offenders-who become more likely to reof-
fend when over-treated. See, e.g., Lowenkamp & Latessa, supra note 326, at 3-8 (noting
that providing unnecessary services to low-risk offenders squanders resources that could
be devoted to the more serious offenders, and, moreover, increases the risk that low of-
fenders will reoffend).
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man may be the man of the present, but the man of the future is
the man of statistics and the master of economics."o30
Indeed, armed with statistical sentencing software of this kind,
a judge could know that sentencing this offender to pay a fine and
serve a term of community service would likely be more effective
at deterring future crime-while still serving the requisite retri-
butive goals of punishment-than even a brief period of incarce-
ration.
Conversely, a judge could know that the optimal sentence for
that offender is thirty-seven months of incarceration. At thirty-
seven months, that offender would be significantly less likely to
re-offend than if sentenced to one to three years in prison, but al-
so less likely to re-offend than if sentenced between thirty-eight
and sixty months.
And if two sentencing alternatives appeared to be equally effec-
tive at reducing recidivism, a judge could impose the least oner-
ous of them, consistent with the parsimony provision in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a).331
The scatter plot is a straightforward way of displaying utilita-
rian drivers of sentencing, but the software could also address re-
tribution-related considerations by highlighting one section of the
horizontal-axis in red. This approach would be a visual variation
on Morris's notion of limiting retributivism.332 The red band would
reflect the recommended sentencing range in terms of proportion-
330. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897)
(emphasis added). Under a traditional economic model that treats people as rational max-
imizers, punishment has a transitive property. Thus, potential offenders should be equally
deterred when there is a one-in-a-thousand chance of fifty years in prison as when there is
a one-in-twenty chance of one year in prison. But research suggests that a great deal of
human decisionmaking is guided not by rationality but by bounded rationality. See, e.g.,
Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Ratio-
nality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1075 (2000). A criminal
act is not usually the product of Boolean cost-benefit analysis, but is more often the conse-
quence of weighing perceived risk against the visceral allures of offending. See JACK KATZ,
SEDUCTIONS OF CRIME 312-17 (1988).
331. By utilizing empirical behavioral models, a sentencing information system would
better allow judges to impose optimal punishments. Cf. Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193 (1985) (describing economic models
for efficient criminal penalties).
332. See NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 73-80 (1974) (suggesting
that retributive considerations should set the upper and possibly lower limits of sentenc-
ing, but that utilitarian considerations might be used to select from not undeserved penal-
ties within this range).
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ality and just deserts. Of course, the judge would be free to sen-
tence outside of the red band (because any sentence on the dis-
play is authorized by statute and therefore reflects Congress's ul-
timate assessment of desert), and may wish to do so if utilitarian
concerns outweigh retributivist ones, or if unusual characteristics
of the offender or the offense so dictate. However, as a general
rule, the red band would serve as an anchoring point for the mor-
al wrongness of the offense, and suggest appropriately retributive
penalties.333
These are the same considerations that judges must consider
when sentencing under § 3553(a), 3 4 but today judges are forced to
guess about how much retribution and how much rehabilitation
should go into a sentence. They must guess whether an offender
needs to be incarcerated to protect the public and whether an of-
fender will successfully turn his life around. "Prediction is inhe-
rent in sentencing decisions.""' Strangely, though, in consigning
people to prison, judges impose their sentences based on less in-
formation about what works and what is cost-effective than phy-
sicians who prescribe medicine.33 1 Imagine how much more effec-
333. In the absence of a uniform federal penal code that organizes offenses by gravity,
the Sentencing Commission might establish red-band recommendations by ordinally rank-
ing federal crimes. They could begin by referring to extant work. See, e.g., THORSTEN
SELLIN & MARVIN E. WOLFGANG, THE MEASUREMENT OF DELINQUENCY 292-310, 318
(1964) (establishing index of offense severity); PETER ROSSI & RICHARD BERK, JUST
PUNISHMENTS: FEDERAL GUIDELINES AND PUBLIC VIEWS COMPARED 33-54, 63-71 (1997)
(assessing public opinion of seventy-three offenses). Of course, real-offense sentencing
would complicate efforts to identify recommended desert-based sentences, but the additive
logic of the Guidelines might be adapted to the endeavor. Desert, unlike the utilitarian
bases for punishment, is not amenable to falsification. See, e.g., Alice Ristroph, Desert,
Democracy, and Sentencing Reform, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1293, 1334-35 (2006)
("Importantly in this 'age of empiricism,' the moral claims of retributivism are non-
falsifiable: one can dispute whether a punishment accords with community sentiments of
desert, but one cannot disprove the underlying claim that it is morally right to impose de-
served punishment."). Still, even a rudimentary ranking of offenses might help rectify the
problems with proportionality that affect the federal system. See United States v. Angelos,
345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1230, 1244-45 (D. Utah 2004) (noting that a defendant who carried
a handgun to two $350 marijuana sales and had guns in his garage is punished twice as
severely under federal law as a drug kingpin responsible for a death, four times as severe-
ly as a second-degree murderer, and five times as severely as someone who rapes a ten-
year-old).
334. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (quoting requirements of § 3553(a)).
335. Michael A. Wolff, Evidence-Based Judicial Discretion: Promoting Public Safety
through State Sentencing Reform, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1389, 1406 (2008).
336. See Sheila M. Bird, Prescribing Sentence: Time for Evidence-Based Justice, 364
LANCET 1457, 1457 (2004) (citations omitted) ("Judges prescribe sentence on lesser evi-
dence about what works and what is cost effective than doctors prescribe medicines. This
is a disservice to the judiciary, public safety, and offenders themselves . . . .').
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tive judges could be if they were equipped with meaningful in-
formation about desert and recidivism, Sara! Not only would they
be able to see what other judges had done when confronted with
an analogous case-allowing a kind of common law of sentencing
to flourish-but they could know whether a given sentence had
worked .33  Even judges confident of their sentencing judgments
would discover that they are more effective when equipped with
actuarial instruments.13 1
It would be evidence-based sentencing.3 39
Sara, I'm pretty sure that federal judges would adore a system
like this. After all, the Judicial Conference of the United States,
the policymaking body for the federal judiciary, endorsed a sys-
tem of this kind in 1977.340
If they were free to impose any sentence permitted under the
statute, and if they were informed about what kind of sentences
had worked and which had not, federal judges would almost cer-
337. See Douglas A. Berman, A Common Law for this Age of Federal Sentencing: The
Opportunity and Need for Judicial Lawmaking, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 93, 94, 110-11
(1993) ("[Ilt remains critically important for federal judges to embrace their opportunities
to actively cultivate a common law of sentencing. By so doing, the federal judiciary can
reestablish its role in federal sentencing lawmaking and still save the federal guidelines
experiment."); Robert W. Sweet et al., Towards a Common Law of Sentencing: Developing
Judicial Precedent in Cyberspace, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 927, 946 (1996) (suggesting statis-
tics could allow "judges to harmonize a new sentence with previous ones").
338. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 cmt. A (Preliminary Draft No. 5,
2007) ("Actuarial-or statistical-predictions of risk, derived from objective criteria, have
been found superior to clinical predictions built on professional training, experience, and
judgment of the persons making predictions."); William M. Grove & Paul E. Meehl, Com-
parative Efficiency of Informal (Subjective, Impressionistic) and Formal (Mechanical, Al-
gorithmic) Prediction Procedures: The Clinical-Statistical Controversy, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 293, 298 (1996) (reporting that in a meta-analysis, actuarial prediction outper-
formed clinical prediction overwhelmingly). Of course, if an actuarial sentencing informa-
tion system can outperform professional judgment, it raises the question of whether the
optimal sentence identified by the system should be a mere recommendation for judges to
consider when exercising their traditional discretion, or whether sentencing should be au-
tomated and mandatory. See supra note 312 (contrasting views of Weber and Hart). Of
course, under existing law, this is a settled matter. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220, 245 (2005) (excising the provision of the federal sentencing statute that made the
Guidelines mandatory).
339. See Wolff, supra note 335, at 1405-08 (describing empirically based sentencing
that draws upon risk assessment instruments).
340. See REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 74-75 (1977), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/JudicialConfer
rence/Proceedings.aspx (follow "1977: March" hyperlink) (endorsing "the concept of a new
probation information system" that would, inter alia, "[pirovide up-to-date information to
guide sentencing courts in selecting sentences for convicted defendants").
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tainly impose sentences that work. They wouldn't have to be
coerced into using sentencing software of this kind. 341
The irony is that software of this kind is available. It has been
for years.342 In an article published in 2004, Oregon State Judge
Michael Marcus described using DSS ("Decision Support Sys-
tems") software on a desktop computer to produce sentencing bar
charts.343 In a screen shot, a variety of fourteen sentencing alter-
natives are displayed (in order of frequency imposed); for each al-
ternative, the percentage of similar offenders who avoided convic-
tion for three years is displayed.344
Software of this kind-programs that can guide judicial discre-
tion during sentencing-has been available for years. Yes, it
would have required a prodigious effort to make data of this kind
available in 1984, but with twenty-five years of development in
computers and software, developing a program to graphically dis-
play the efficacy of sentences would be pretty straightforward.
Of course, even the most zealous proponents of actuarial sen-
tencing do not pretend that it is a panacea, or that a scatter plot
of data can adequately substitute for the exercise of human
judgment.345 It is well understood that merely "incanting the word
'information' is not a magical solution."346 Yet there is little doubt
that judges would profit from having empirical information about
the efficacy of sentencing alternatives.
The existing Guidelines are empirical in part, drawing upon
historical sentencing practice to establish ranges for many cate-
341. See Michael A. Wolff, Missouri's Information-Based Discretionary Sentencing Sys-
tem, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 95, 101 (2006) ("The starting point for the Missouri Sentencing
Advisory Commission was how to influence judicial discretion. There are other actors-
notably, prosecutors, probation officers, and others-whose hearts and minds also must be
won. The challenge is daunting because of the varying attitudes and influences of all the
various actors-law enforcement, prosecutors, defense attorneys, probation officers,
judges, prison officials, the Parole Board, and parole officers. Unless the Commission can
give these actors something they need, they have no reason to pay attention to us.").
342. See Miller & Wright, supra note 322, at 371 (describing sentencing information
systems used by foreign jurisdictions).
343. See Michael Marcus, Smarter Sentencing: On the Need to Consider Crime Reduc-
tion as a Goal, CT. REV., Winter 2004, at 16, 20-21.
344. Id.
345. Douglas A. Berman & Steven L. Chanenson, Can and Will Information Spur Post-
Modern Sentencing Reforms?, 19 FED. SEN'G REP. 219, 220 (2007).
346. Id.
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gories of offenses.347 It certainly would be consistent with that ap-
proach for the Commission to provide judges with information
about the likely outcomes of sentences they might impose.148 The
necessary information should be available in existing databas-
es.'4  The information needed to identify analogous offenders
should be contained in presentence reports,350 while arrest and re-
conviction data should be a matter of public record.
Of course, there would be serious logistical challenges in im-
plementing a sentencing information system of this kind. Using
official statistics (such as re-arrest or re-conviction) always im-
plies a series of discretionary judgments, ' and these statistics
347. See Breyer, supra note 104, at 181 ("We found typical past practice by asking pro-
bation officers to analyze more than 10,000 cases. These analyses, along with data from
100,000 other cases, were entered into the commission's computers . . . .").
348. It has been suggested that a new agency be established to manage national sen-
tencing data and research. See Miller & Wright, supra note 322, at 378 (noting that al-
though "the U.S. Sentencing Commission already has substantial data and information
duties . . . we believe the Commission's role as a policymaker and its dominant focus on
the federal criminal justice system make it a poor repository of national data responsibili-
ties."). The authors recommend creating a separate National Sentencing Institute, even if
only the federal system is at stake. Id. at 378-79. I would suggest, however, that the U.S.
Sentencing Commission would be well situated to manage a sentencing information sys-
tem of this kind. See William W. Wilkins, Jr., The United States Sentencing Commission:
Its Many Missions, FED. PROB., Dec. 1991, at 26, 26-28 (describing data collection, re-
search, and evaluation responsibilities of the Commission).
349. See Miller, supra note 321, at 1390, who notes:
Far from being an academic fantasy, systems like this are already beginning
to emerge in one of the most inhospitable places-the federal sentencing sys-
tem. The United States Sentencing Commission already makes extensive
sentencing data files available, albeit in large chunks, late, and with some
substantial questions about the quality of the data. Some of the sentencing
commission data has been combined with information from other federal
agencies and organized in a much more accessible, interactive fashion by the
Federal Justice Statistics Resource Center, an arm of the Bureau of Justice
Statistics in the U.S. Department of Justice. An even more impressive private
effort to organize vast quantities of data about the operation of the federal
government, including prosecutorial and sentencing information, is being
conducted by the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) under
the name of TRACFED. While neither of these systems yet offers a full feder-
al [sentencing information system], they suggest how useful even the re-
stricted current federal sentencing information can be if restructured and
made available through a relatively straightforward (if not exactly intuitive)
interface.
Id.
350. See OFFICE OF PROBATION AND PRETRIAL SERVICES, THE PRESENTENCE INVESTI-
GATION REPORT, at 1-3, 1-4 (2006), available at http://www.fd.org/odstb-SentencingRe
source3.htm (describing contents of federal presentence reports).
351. See John I. Kitsuse & Aaron V. Cicourel, A Note on the Use of Official Statistics,
11 Soc. PROBS. 131, 133 (1963) (noting that official statistics may tell us more about the
exercise of discretion in the criminal justice system than about actual rates of crime).
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operate as an imperfect proxy for real deterrence or rehabilita-
tion. Ensuring the accuracy of all data entered into the database
would be essential (requiring a firm commitment to quality con-
trol)352 and there would be technical obstacles to overcome in es-
tablishing the smooth flow of information from external databas-
es.353
Establishing an outcome-based sentencing information system
would also entail analytic challenges. For example, judges would
not be able to draw directly from the last twenty years of federal
sentencing data because that data would reflect the homogenizing
influence of the mandatory Guidelines regime.3 5 4 Similarly, man-
datory minimum sentences would frustrate any effort to identify
optimal sentences that lay below the statutory floor. While it
might be possible to use pre-Guidelines data, twenty years of
crime legislation has changed the statutory landscape enormous-
ly, and the availability of parole prior to 1984 would mask the ac-
tual sentences served.
Some of the challenges in establishing a sentencing system of
this kind are neither technical nor analytical in nature, but philo-
352. See generally CYRUS TATA ET AL., A SENTENCING INFORMATION SYSTEM FOR THE
HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY OF SCOTLAND: REPORT OF THE STUDY OF THE FIRST PHASE OF
IMPLEMENTATION, EVALUATION AND ENHANCEMENT (2002) (describing qualitative and
quantitative data issues in establishment of Scottish Sentencing Information System).
353. The federal Probation and Pretrial Services System's Access to Law Enforcement
Systems ("ATLAS") Supervised Release File platform merges data from both the National
Crime Information Center (NCIC) and Nlets. See ADMIN. OFFICES OF THE U.S. COURTS,
2009 LONG RANGE PLAN FOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 11
(2009); National Crime Information Center, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.
fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ncic/ncic (last visited Dec. 3, 2010); What We Do, INT'L JUST. & PUB.
SAFETY INFO. SHARING NETWORK, http://www.nlets.org/whatWeDo.aspx (last visited Dec.
3, 2010). A sentencing information system like the one described may also draw upon data
contained in the judiciary's PACTS and CMIECF systems, and the e-designate interface
developed by the Federal Bureau of Prisons.
354. It may be possible to use state sentencing data, which would be valid inasmuch as
state offenders and sentences are comparable to federal offenders sentenced to federal fa-
cilities. If state data cannot be matched to federal sentencing, it might be necessary to look
to departures and variances, or perhaps Bureau of Prisons programming, to identify prom-
ising directions for sentencing trends. For example, a scatter plot with a negative linear
relationship between sentence length and recidivism (in which recidivism decreases as
sentence length increases) may justify imposition of an even longer sentence than had
been imposed under the Guidelines; conversely, if the plot depicts a positive linear rela-
tionship (in which the risk of recidivism increases as sentence length increases), a sen-
tence somewhere below Guidelines range may seem appropriate. It would take time for
sentencing alternatives to emerge and for recidivism data to become available. Thoroughly
informed decisionmaking would be possible only when recidivism data becomes available
for the whole statutory range of sentencing alternatives.
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sophical.66 Some might object that evidence-based sentencing pu-
nishes defendants for the crimes of others (e.g., defendant X gets
a long prison sentence just because he resembles offenders who
avoided recidivism only when they received long prison sen-
tences). 356 The idea of punishing people for offenses they didn't
commit veers dangerously close to the concept of precrime illu-
strated in Minority Report.5 1 Certainly, there are theorists who
believe that utilitarian concerns should play no role in punish-
ment, and that sentences should be imposed purely upon desert.358
But this argument has already been settled. After all, you, Sa-
ra, stated that sentencing should draw upon all four traditional
grounds for punishment: deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilita-
tion, and retribution .3 59 The first three of these justifications could
be more rigorously applied at sentencing if recidivism data were
available to sentencing judges.
Thornier, perhaps, is the problem of sentencing disparity. After
all, the reduction of unwarranted sentencing disparity lies at your
heart.360 Under a system of evidence-based sentencing, two first-
time offenders convicted of the same crime might get very differ-
ent sentences. It smacks of the inequities that prompted the
Guidelines in the first place.36 '
But people must be careful about fetishizing parity in sentenc-
ing, for infatuation with equality, although meant well, can lead
355. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION 33, 109-92 (2d ed. 2007) (rais-
ing economic and philosophical arguments against the use of risk prediction instruments
in the criminal justice system).
356. See id. at 190-92.
357. See MINORITY REPORT (DreamWorks 2002) (depicting society in which precogni-
tive visionaries can identify crimes before they occur); see also Robert Batey, Minority Re-
port and the Law of Attempt, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 689, 694-98 (2004) (discussing the
point at which it is appropriate to hold actors responsible for inchoate offenses).
358. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 198 (W. Hastie trans., The Law-
book Exchange, Ltd. 2002) (1887) ("Even if a Civil Society resolved to dissolve itself with
the consent of all its members-as might be supposed in the case of a People inhabiting an
island resolving to separate and scatter themselves throughout the whole world-the last
Murderer lying in the prison ought to be executed before the resolution was carried out.
This ought to be done in order that every one may realize the desert of his deeds, and that
bloodguiltiness may not remain upon the people; for otherwise they might all be regarded
as participators in the murder as a public violation of Justice.").
359. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006).
360. See Feinberg, supra note 13, at 295 (describing the elimination of sentencing dis-
parity as the "first and foremost goal" of the SRA).
361. See King & Klein, supra note 38, at 318-19.
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to unintended consequences.362 In reality, each human being is
unique. The notion of 'like" sentences for "like" offenders is a le-
gal fiction maintained by excluding those characteristics deemed
irrelevant for purposes of punishment.3 63 Even then, two defen-
dants who receive the same sentence in the same prison may
have radically different subjective experiences.3 6'
Reasonable minds may differ about which characteristics to in-
clude and exclude from the calculus of punishment. Historically,
judges considered a wide range of characteristics in their sentenc-
ing decisions."' When you were enacted, Sara, Congress directed
the Commission to "maintain[] sufficient flexibility to permit in-
dividualized sentences when warranted,"3 6 6 to ensure the Guide-
lines were "entirely neutral as to the race, sex, national origin,
creed, and socioeconomic status of offenders,"67 and to take into
account (though only to the extent that they are relevant to sen-
tencing) eleven offender characteristics:
(1) age; (2) education; (3) vocational skills; (4) mental and emotional
condition to the extent that such condition mitigates the defendant's
culpability or to the extent that such condition is otherwise plainly
relevant; (5) physical condition, including drug dependence; (6) pre-
vious employment record; (7) family ties and responsibilities; (8)
community ties; (9) role in the offense; (10) criminal history; and (11)
degree of dependence upon criminal activity for a livelihood."'
362. See KURT VONNEGUT, Harrison Bergeron, in WELCOME TO THE MONKEY HOUSE 7,
7-14 (1968) (describing intentional handicapping of athletes, artists, and the otherwise
able in an effort to force lockstep equality).
363. See Peter K. Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 539-40,
542 (1982) (suggesting the notion that like individuals should be treated alike" is a mere
tautology, and that "[e]quality, therefore, is an idea that should be banished from moral
and legal discourse as an explanatory norm").
364. See TONRY, supra note 4, at 19 ('Two years' imprisonment in a maximum security
prison may be a rite of passage for a Los Angeles gang member. For an attractive, effemi-
nate twenty-year-old, it may mean the terror of repeated sexual victimization. For a forty-
year-old head of household, it may mean the loss of a job and a home and a family. For an
unhealthy seventy-five-year-old, it may be a death sentence."); Adam J. Kolber, The Sub-
jective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 182, 183 (2009) (describing the in-
equities of punishment imposed by subjecting more sensitive and less sensitive prisoners
to "like" punishments).
365. This was not always appropriate. See RICHARD QUINNEY, THE SOCIAL REALITY OF
CRIME 141-42 (Transaction Publishers 2001) (1970) ("[Jludicial decisions are not made
uniformly. Decisions are made according to a host of extralegal factors, including the age
of the offender, his race, and social class.").
366. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2006).
367. Id. § 994(d).
368. Id.
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The Commission seized upon criminal history as highly rele-
vant,6 ' but concluded, without explanation, that among the other
enumerated characteristics, a defendant's education and voca-
tional skills, 370 employment record,"" family ties and responsibili-
ties,72 and mental and emotional conditions373 are not ordinarily
relevant.
Two offenders, who seem equivalent when only relevant con-
duct, criminal history, and substantial assistance are considered,
suddenly appear very different when judges include discouraged
characteristics in their sentencing decisions. Suddenly, identical
sentences imposed on these two offenders, with very different
educational experiences, career paths, and family responsibilities,
appear inequitable and unfair. Thus, changes in the permitted
categories of sentencing variables (such as risk-related variables)
will produce changes in what appear to be equitable sentences.7
In affording weight to sentencing factors that were not included
in the once-binding Guidelines, judges will (quite reasonably) ar-
369. See SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 100, at 41 ("From a crime control pers-
pective, a criminal history component is especially important because it is predictive of
recidivism."); Nagel, supra note 76, at 924 (noting that commissioners determined that "an
offender's criminal history score would dramatically affect an offender's ultimate sen-
tence").
370. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.2 (2008).
371. Id. § 5H1.5.
372. Id. § 5H1.6.
373. Id. § 5H1.3.
374. The question of which risk-related factors courts can (and should) consider is a
difficult one. See John Monahan, A Jurispridence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm
Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 434-39 (2006) (describing
tension between legitimate sentencing considerations and predictive risk factors). Mona-
han notes:
In the past, courts rarely have had to address jurisprudential considerations
in making violence risk assessments because actuarial instruments with
scientific validity in assessing violence risk did not exist. Now, such instru-
ments do exist and are being used with increasing frequency in criminal sen-
tencing, the civil commitment of people with serious mental disorder, and the
civil commitment of sexually violent predators. Among the empirically valid
risk factors that are candidates for inclusion on these instruments are those
that pertain to what the person is (age, gender, racelethnicity, and personali-
ty), what the person has (major mental disorder, personality disorder, and
substance abuse disorder), what the person has done (prior crimes and vi-
olence), and what has been done to the person (being raised in a pathological
family environment and being physically victimized). Jurisprudential consid-
erations in premising legal decisions on these specific risk factors can no
longer be avoided: Their appearance on actuarial prediction instruments
makes their use apparent.
Id. at 434-35.
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rive at different sentences than those obtained under the Guide-
lines.
The observation is not dismissive of Marvin Frankel's concerns
about identical offenders receiving disparate punishments based
on nothing more than the idiosyncrasies of sentencing judges.375
Unwarranted sentencing disparity of that kind is a blight upon
any fair system of punishment. But legislators, judges, and the
public should be equally cautious about focusing myopically upon
uniformity in sentencing while ignoring other legitimate objec-
tives (e.g., reduction of recidivism). After all, as noted by one
judge, the "disparities based on the risk of reoffending-as meas-
ured, perhaps, by the severity of the offense and the offender's
criminal history-may be acceptable and even desirable."376
Ultimately, the solution is to provide judges with reliable data,
allow them to evaluate the empirical evidence and competing pe-
nological considerations, and impose appropriate sentences. This
is what judges do well: evaluate evidence to arrive at judgments.
A sentencing information system that informs judges about the
actuarial risks of recidivism and that identifies retributive con-
siderations (such as proportionality and desert) would be extraor-
dinarily helpful. Without such a system, judges will be swinging
blindly at the metaphorical pifiata of sentencing, sending defen-
dants to prison based upon nothing more than the qualitative in-
formation in the presentence report and the rudimentary quan-
titative information mandated by the advisory Guidelines (e.g.,
the adjusted offense level and criminal history category). Without
question, judges will do the best they can, but will, by necessity,
make their decisions using limited information.
Those who worry about a gradual drift toward disparity under
the post-Booker advisory Guidelines may be well advised to sup-
port an evidence-based sentencing information system of this
kind. Such a system would serve as a noncoercive means of
channeling the discretion of federal judges. The alternatives to
such a system-"Blakelyizing" sentencing factors,' 7 expanding
375. See FRANKEL, supra note 39, at 21 (describing judges with wildly differing views of
what kind of sentence a draft resister should receive).
376. See Wolff, supra note 335, at 1401-02 (emphasis added).
377. The notion of "Blakelyizing" sentencing factors is explored in Justice Stevens's dis-
sent in the remedial portion of Booker. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 285-91
(2005). For a description of the problems associated with the Blakelyizing federal sentenc-
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the use of mandatory minimum sentences,378 or simply exhorting
judges to adhere to the advisory Guidelines-are all problematic.
An evidence-based sentencing information system is the best
available option.379
Twenty-five years have passed since Congress enacted the Sen-
tencing Reform Act of 1984. In that time, four key changes have
occurred:
(1) The Guidelines have grown increasingly complex and severe, and
are widely disliked;38 0
(2) The Guidelines have been made toothless-the Supreme Court
struck down as unconstitutional the provisions that made them
mandatory in Booker;s8
(3) Actuarial risk prediction has improved significantly;3 " and
(4) Computers have become cheaper, faster, and much better con-
nected.'
In light of these four developments, the Commission may wish to
establish an evidence-based sentencing information system. It
could rebrand itself and issue a superior product, supplement-
ing-or, better still, supplanting altogether-the advisory Guide-
lines with a sentencing information system. Most of the necessary
statutory authority to achieve this goal already exists; you, Sara,
provided the Commission with most of the authority it would
ing, see Frank 0. Bowman, III, Train Wreck? Or Can the Federal Sentencing System Be
Saved? A Plea for Rapid Reversal of Blakely v. Washington, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 217,
235-39 (2004) (describing legal and logistical challenges associated with Blakelyizing
Guidelines).
378. See Bowman, supra note 377, at 264 (describing alternative of expanded mandato-
ry minimum sentencing).
379. See Miller, supra note 321, at 1391 ("The idea of providing better, more complete,
faster information to lawyers, judges, scholars, and reformers may be the most attractive
sentencing reform model, as it is one that does not rely on government agencies alone to
develop wise sentencing rules and practices."); see also ROGER K. WARREN, CRIME AND
JUSTICE INST., EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICE TO REDUCE RECIDIVISM 50-51 (2007), available
at http://www.wicourts.gov/about/organization/programs/docs/cjijudicialpaperfinal.pdf (in-
cluding "creating offender-based data and sentencing support systems that facilitate data-
driven sentencing decisions" as a key recommended sentencing reform for states).
380. See supra Part III.A.1 (describing complexity of the Guidelines).
381. See supra notes 253-86 and accompanying text.
382. See David Boener & Roxanne Lieb, Sentencing Reform and the Other Washington,
28 CRIME & JUST. 71, 114 (2001).
383. See supra notes 308-22 and accompanying text.
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need.384 And to the extent that you imposed obligations inconsis-
tent with an evidence-based approach, the Commission should
seek requisite statutory changes to 28 U.S.C. §§ 991 to 998, and
Congress should enact the requested changes.
Since the Guidelines were promulgated, the number of prison-
ers in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons has increased geome-
trically. In 1985, while the Guidelines were being drafted, there
were 35,781 people in federal custody;385 as of June 13, 2009, there
were 194,435.86 At an annual cost of roughly $25,000 per in-
matem3 7 the United States now spends more than $5.5 billion dol-
lars annually on incarcerating federal prisoners.3 88 Many of these
offenders are nonviolent,' and could be safely supervised in their
communities at a fraction of the cost.390 By incarcerating only
those who require imprisonment, and by limiting terms of impri-
sonment to the minimum durations necessary to reduce reoffend-
ing, correctional resources could be used far more efficiently.
Prison crowding (and all of its attendant evils) could be reduced.39'
The number of people unnecessarily subjected to the pain of im-
384. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 995(a)(13), (15), (16) (2006).
385. See UTILIZATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS PROJECT, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS: NUMBER AND RATE (PER 100,000 U.S. RESIDENTS) OF
PERSONS IN STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONS AND LOCAL JAILS tbl.6.13.2009 (Kathleen Ma-
guire ed., 2009), available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdflt6l32009.pdf (report-
ing federal prison population over time).
386. See Weekly Population Report, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, http://www.bop.gov/loca
tions/weekly-reports.jsp (last visited Dec. 3, 2010).
387. See Memorandum from Matthew Rowland, Deputy Assistant Dir., Office of Prob.
& Pretrial Servs., to Chief Probation Officers, and Chief Pretrial Servs. Officers (May 6,
2008) (on file with author). The memo, titled "Cost of Incarceration and Supervision," re-
ported that the annual cost for a single prisoner's imprisonment in the Bureau of Prisons
was $24,992. Id.
388. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT:
FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 95, 97 (2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/
fy2011/assets/budget.pdf (reporting estimated 2009 fiscal year budget of $5.534 billion for
the Federal Bureau of Prisons).
389. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE FEDERAL PRISON POPULATION: A STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS, http://www.sentencingproject.orglAdmin/Documents/publications/incfederalpri
sonpop.pdf (reporting that "nearly three-fourths (72.1%) of federal prisoners are serving
time for a non-violent offense and have no history of violence").
390. See Memorandum from Matthew Rowland, supra note 387 (reporting the annual
cost of probation supervision as $3,621.64).
391. See Oleson, supra note 45, at 850-53 (outlining the negative consequences of pris-
on crowding); see also Craig Haney, Psychology and the Limits to Prison Pain: Confronting
the Coming Crisis in Eighth Amendment Law, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 499, 552-59
(1997) (describing constitutional problems associated with prison crowding).
2011] 759
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
prisonment could be minimized"' and second-order effects upon
families and communities reduced accordingly.'3
By simply providing judges with information about sentencing
efficacy, the Commission could reduce the resources squandered
on mass incarceration. There is good reason to believe that any
information system that could reduce the prison population while
maintaining public safety would be supported by the judiciary94
and the Congress. 9 5
V. CONCLUSION
You were born of good intentions, Sara:
[Clertainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing,
avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal con-
duct while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized
sentences when warranted. . . ."
This was a laudable vision."' But, as the saying goes, the road to
hell is paved with good intentions, and the guidelines that con-
392. See generally Gresham M. Sykes, The Pains of Imprisonment, in THE SOCIETY OF
CAPTIVES: A STUDY OF A MAXIMUM SECURITY PRISON 63, 63-78 (1971) (describing depriva-
tions of liberty, goods and services, heterosexual relationships, autonomy, and security).
393. See, e.g., TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: How MASS INCARCERATION
MAKES DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE (2007) (describing corrosive effects of
incarceration upon poor communities); INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002)
(describing impact of prison on families and communities).
394. See KENNEDY COMM'N, supra note 329, at 4 ("There are realistic limits to efforts at
rehabilitation. We must try, however, to bridge the gap between proper skepticism about
rehabilitation on the one hand and improper refusal to acknowledge that the more than
two million inmates in the United States are human beings whose minds and spirits we
must try to reach." (quoting Justice Kennedy)).
395. See, e.g., National Criminal Justice Commission Act of 2009, S.714, 111th Cong. §
6(a)(1) (2009) (charging a proposed Criminal Justice Commission with "refocus[ing] incar-
ceration policies to reduce the overall incarceration rate while preserving public safety,
cost-effectiveness, and societal fairness"); Scott, supra note 263, at 7-8 (describing problem
of overincarceration).
396. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2006).
397. See Norval Morris, Punishment, Desert and Rehabilitation, in SENTENCING 257
(Hyman Gross & Andrew Von Hirsch eds., 1981) ("A recently developed plan, currently
under discussion in the Department of Justice, may prove a useful step in that direction
[of imposing order on sentencing]. The proposal calls for the abolition of the Federal Parole
Board and the creation of Commission on Sentencing, composed of nine commissioners
whose task it would be to promulgate guidelines to sentencing in the federal system....
This plan is politically sophisticated and practical; its broad thrust, gradually bringing
defined criteria and appellate review to sentencing, is to be welcomed.").
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trolled federal sentencing for the last twenty-two years have been
hellish. They aimed for too much.3"s Guidelines turned people into
numbers,3 99 transformed judges into calculators,400 changed proba-
tion officers into quasi-legal fact finders 0 1 inflamed interbranch
hostilities between Congress and the courts,40 2 and increased the
federal prison population five-fold.403
Some of this was your fault, Sara. You implied that you wanted
tougher sentences,40 4 but then failed to specify which sentencing
philosophies should be used to achieve them.4 05 But the fault is
not entirely yours. Many other institutional actors share in the
blame. For example, by failing to engage in the discussion about
sentencing guidelines, the Judicial Conference of the United
States bears some responsibility for the guidelines system that
was imposed upon it.406 The Commission obviously shares in the
blame, as well.4o7 Adopting modified real offense sentencing per-
398. See Kate Stith & Karen Dunn, A Second Chance for Sentencing Reform: Establish-
ing a Sentencing Agency in the Judicial Branch, 58 STAN. L. REV. 217, 228 (2005) (suggest-
ing that sentencing reform fails because of "too much ambition-especially, as evidenced
by the Sentencing Reform Act and the Sentencing Guidelines, when such ambition is suf-
fused with a utopian impulse").
399. See Luna, supra note 138, at 39 ("Under the Guidelines, judges thus confront de-
fendants as numbers rather than as human beings.").
400. See BERT BRANDENBURG & AMY KAY, JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN, COURTS ... OR
CALCULATORS? THE ROLE OF COURTS IN CRIMINAL SENTENCING 4 (2004), http://www.just
iceatstake.org/media/cms/sentencingBrief_7B7B273FA18FD.pdf ("Federal judges are on
their way to becoming more stenographer than Solomon.").
401. See Sharon M. Bunzel, Note, The Probation Officer and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: Strange Philosophical Bedfellows, 104 YALE L.J. 933, 960 (1995) ("No longer
able to focus on the individual to facilitate rehabilitation, the probation officer has been
transformed into a component of determinate sentencing and of a just deserts penal phi-
losophy.").
402. See Zlotnick, supra note 178, at 222, 251 (citation omitted) (describing judges who
"essentially apologized to defendants and their families and blamed Congress for tying
their hands" and members of Congress who have vowed "'to scour the output of federal
judges for evidence of what they call 'judicial abuse'"').
403. Compare UTILIZATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS PROJECT, supra note 385
(reporting 35,781 prisoners in federal custody in 1985), with Weekly Population Report,
supra note 386 (reporting 194,435 prisoners in custody at latest count).
404. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(m) (2006).
405. See Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 19 (describing Commission's failure to identi-
fy an organizing theory of punishment).
406. See Robert Howell, Sentencing Reform Lessons: From the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984 to the Feeney Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1069, 1081 (2004) ("Judges
are themselves largely to blame for their absence from a central role in developing sen-
tencing policy.").
407. See TONRY, supra note 4, at 90-91 (describing seven "technical or technocratic"
policy choices made by the Commission-not compelled by the SRA-that led to resent-
ment of the Guidelines).
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verted the adversarial system of justice in federal courts, 40 8 but
failed to empower judges.409 Congress contributed to the problem
by enacting incoherent mandatory minimum sentences that fru-
strated the Commission's effort to maintain a scaled system of
Guidelines penalties,'40 and it further muddied things by amend-
ing the Guidelines directly.11 The Department of Justice bears
considerable responsibility, too, by requiring prosecutors to
charge "'the most serious, readily provable' offense,"412 and by op-
erating fast-track programs in some places but not others, while
simultaneously condemning sentencing disparity.411
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker recast
the landscape, however. In holding that the Guidelines are advi-
sory,4 14 the Court diverted federal sentencing from the road to
hell. Today, judges are free to consider any factors they deem re-
levant, and to weigh the goals of sentencing in whatever way they
deem fit, subject to reasonableness review by the courts of ap-
peals.415
408. See Bunzel, supra note 401, at 957-60 (stating the Sentencing Reform Act drasti-
cally changed the purpose of the presentence report and probation officer from rehabilita-
tion of offenders to essential elements in sentence determination).
409. See Luna, supra note 138, at 51 ("In practice, the relevant conduct provisions only
amplified the already awe-inspiring prosecutorial power and helped transform U.S. Attor-
neys into the real sentencers in the federal system.").
410. See Hatch, supra note 304, at 194 ("While the Commission has consistently sought
to incorporate mandatory minimums into the guidelines system in an effective and rea-
sonable manner, in certain fundamental respects, the general approaches of the two sys-
tems are inconsistent." (footnote omitted)).
411. See Zlotnick, supra note 178, at 232. ("While the Sentencing Commission's influ-
ence had fallen considerably since its inception for a variety of reasons, the Feeney
Amendment was the first time that Congress actually wrote Guidelines language itself,
bypassing the Sentencing Commission entirely." (footnote omitted)).
412. Stith, supra note 98, at 1442 (quoting 8 DEP'T JUST. MANUAL § 9-27.310 (Aspen
1993)) ("The project to achieve nationwide uniformity in sentencing, as represented by the
Sentencing Reform Act and the Guidelines, became, from the perspective of Main Justice,
a project to achieve nationwide centralization of prosecutorial power, as represented by
the Thornburgh Memorandum and its successors.").
413. See FIFTEEN YEARS REPORT, supra note 3, at 106 ("Practitioners and commenta-
tors have expressed concern that the presence of these [fast-track] programs in some dis-
tricts, and their absence from neighboring districts, could lead to disparate sentencing
outcomes for offenders convicted of similar conduct." (citing Public Hearing Before the U.S.
Sentencing Commission 6-7 (Aug. 19, 2003), available at http://www.ussc.govLegislative-
andPublicAffairs/Publichearings._andMeetings/20030819/0819USSC.pdf)).
414. 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
415. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347, 350-51 (2007) (articulating rule for
reasonableness review).
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After Booker, however, sentencing has become increasingly
complicated. The calculation of the Guidelines-which used to be
the end of the analysis-is now just the beginning. The court
must still break out its abacus and Dungeon Master's Guide,'416 al-
though the product of these calculations-the advisory sentencing
range-is but a preliminary step in a full § 3553(a) analysis. Any
court that calculates the Guidelines range and ends their inquiry,
risks being reversed.417 The process has grown elaborately Byzan-
tine, yet still cannot provide judges with predictive information
about sentencing alternatives to reduce recidivism.
Thankfully, a paradigm shift lies within reach. Instead of bas-
ing federal sentences on political intuitions, the Commission
could provide sentencing judges with meaningful data about
which available sentences are most effective in reducing recidiv-
ism. Improvements in risk assessment and technology have made
it possible for the Commission to provide judges with data that
were scarcely imaginable twenty-five years ago.
Even five years ago, given the acrimonious climate between
Congress and the courts,'4 1 it was difficult to envision a system of
this kind. But much has changed. Given the Feeney Amendment,
Booker and its progeny, and a growing interest in evidence-based
policy, 419 an actuarial sentencing information system is not only
intellectually conceivable, but socially and politically viable.
So that, Sara, is my wish for your birthday: an actuarial sen-
tencing information system that allows federal judges to impose
data-driven sentences that are effective, efficient, and fair. It is
something that, at twenty-five, you might become.
So close your eyes, make a wish, and blow out all the candles.
416. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (comparing guidelines manuals to the
Dungeons and Dragons handbook).
417. See Nelson v. United States, 555 U.S._ , 129 S. Ct. 890, 891-92 (2009).
418. See Zlotnick, supra note 178, at 242-55 (describing the politics of federal sentenc-
ing).
419. See, e.g., URBAN INSTITUTE, BEYOND IDEOLOGY, POLITICS, AND GUESSWORK: THE
CASE FOR EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY 5 (2008), available at http://www.urban.org/Uploaded
PDFI901189_evidencebased.pdf ("During the first half of 2008, evidence-based decision-
making seemed on the rise.. . . The U.S. Sentencing Commission is holding open discus-
sions about mandatory minimums and federal sentencing guidelines. Growing evidence is
finding a policy audience.').
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